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ABSTRACT
For many years, the big news in the United States courts of appeal was the
skyrocketing immigration caseload. For courts that traditionally had busy immigration
dockets, the effect was tsunamic. One of those circuits, the Second, instituted a
nonargument calendar that, over the past five years, has enabled the court to regain
some control over its swollen docket. While this administrative strategy has rescued the
court from drowning, the flow of cases continues, somewhat abated, but with enduring
force. This so-called surge had unanticipated consequences extending far beyond court
management changes. As a result of their increased exposure to immigration cases at the
hearing stage—reading transcripts and immigration judge decisions—federal judges
increasingly found fault with immigration adjudication, criticizing the quality of both the
judging and the lawyering. The glaring attention generated public reaction, forcing some
reforms from the inside and continuing pressure from the outside. This Article examines
the legacy of this exposure and its positive impact on the quest for better access to justice
for immigrants facing removal.
I.
II.

III.

*

INTRODUCTION
UNDERSTANDING THE FLOOD
A. What Caused the Surge of Immigration Appeals?
B. Leveling Off to a “New Normal”
1.
Life Preservers: Court Management Solutions
2.
Inside the Lifeboat: An Even Closer Look at the Second Circuit
SIGHTING LAND
A. The Tide of Appeals is Subsiding
1.
A System-Wide Decline
2.
Four Possible Reasons for the System-Wide Decline
i.
Decrease in Cases and Appeals at the Agency Level
ii. Decrease in Asylum Denials, Increase in Representation
iii. Immigration Court Backlog
iv. More Detained Cases
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B.

Pressures on the Agency to Respond
1.
Pressures on Immigration Judges to Improve Their Performance
i.
From the Circuit Courts
ii. From the Attorney General
2.
Pressures on the BIA
IV. THE FLOOD WATERS RECEDE: THE LEGACY OF THE SURGE
A. Stimulating Renewed Civic Engagement in Support of Fairer Proceedings
and More Due Process for Immigrants
1.
Access to Legal Representation
2.
Assuring Effective Assistance of Counsel
i.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims in the Circuit Courts
ii. Policing the Bar
B. Stimulating Renewed Calls for Systemic Reform
1.
Restructuring Immigration Adjudication
2.
Enabling the Use of Prosecutorial Discretion
V. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2002, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal found themselves in
the midst of a “surge,” a sudden and spectacular jump in the number of immigration
appeals that quickly swamped and overwhelmed the federal appeals courts.1 In 2001, the
last year of quiet before the storm, the federal appeals courts received 3300
administrative appeals nationwide, of which 1760 (53.3%) involved the legacy
Immigration and Naturalization Service.2 By 2004, the number of immigration cases in
the federal appeals courts soared to 10,812 (88.2% of all administrative appeals and
1

See John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many People
Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the
Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) [hereinafter Palmer et al., Surge in
Petitions]; John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis¸ 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 14–15 (2006); Comm. on Fed. Cts., Ass’n of
the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Surge of Immigration Appeals and Its Impact on the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals (Aug. 31, 2004), available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/AppealSurgeReport.pdf
[hereinafter Fed. Cts. Comm. Rep.]; Immigration Appeals Surge in Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH (Sept.
2003), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/03-0901/Immigration_Appeals_Surge_in_Courts.aspx [hereinafter THIRD BRANCH]; Marcia Coyle, Immigration
Appeals Surge, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 3, 2003, ; Claire Cooper & Emily Bazar, Immigration Appeals Swamp
Federal Courts, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 5, 2004, at A1, available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/04/ImmigrationAppealsSacBee.pdf; Stanley Mailman & Stephen YaleLoehr, Immigration Appeals Overwhelm Federal Courts, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 27, 2004, available at
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=900005420783&slreturn=1; Stanley Mailman &
Stephen Yale-Loehr, Immigration Appeals Continue to Overwhelm Federal Courts, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=900005421969; Solomon Moore & Ann M. Simmons,
Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal Appellate Courts, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2005, at A1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2005/may/02/local/me-backlog2.
2
LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2004 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR Table B-3 (2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2004/appendices/b3.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL
BUSINESS, 2004].
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17.2% of all appeals nationwide).3 The rate, as well as the volume, of appeals nationwide
from adverse decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) rose
extraordinarily.4 Although the drastic spike has leveled off, record numbers of
noncitizens facing final orders of removal continue to file petitions for review:5 12,349 in
2005, 11,911 in 2006, 9123 in 2007, 10,280 in 2008, abating slightly to 7518 in 2009.6
Today, we can see clearly that the surge is not temporary and continues to burden
the courts.7 More than seven years after the floodgates opened, the steady flow of cases
has inexorably altered the landscape of federal judicial review of immigration cases. It is
increasingly evident that the true legacy of the surge lies in the considerable unintended
consequences that are just beginning to make an impression at both the administrative
and federal appellate courts. The surge is responsible for innovative case management
techniques, which, for better or for worse, have relieved much of the pressure on the
courts. More fundamentally, the surge has helped raise awareness of the need for
systemic change, particularly by invigorating civic commitment to assuring effective
legal representation. At the time of the initial influx of cases, no one could have predicted
the variety of voices that now participate in the conversation about immigration
adjudication, nor could they have anticipated the intensity and perseverance of the
responses or foreseen some of the proposed or actual reforms. The surge has had a
catalytic effect on several important institutional changes and reform initiatives, and even
more are likely to happen. Given this new climate, it is time to move beyond examining
the causes of the surge to study its impact, particularly on the public discourse within the
legal profession about immigration court practice.8
3

Id.
Appeals from decisions involving the BIA account for almost the entire increase in filings. A Decade of
Change in the Federal Courts Caseload: Fiscal Years 1997–2006, THE THIRD BRANCH (Nov. 2007),
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/07-11
01/A_Decade_of_Change_in_the_Federal_Courts_Caseload_Fiscal_Years_1997-2006.aspx. By 2006, the
number of BIA decisions appealed to the federal courts out of the total number of BIA decisions had
increased from a historical 5% (before 2002) to approximately 30%. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BIA
Restructuring and Streamlining Procedures (Mar. 9, 2006), available at
http://wwwusdoj.gov/eoir/press/06/BIAStreamliningFactSheet030906.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice]. Prior to 2002, federal courts were receiving about 125 BIA case appeals per month. Id.
By 2006, they were receiving more than one thousand per month. If the rate of appeal had remained
constant at its pre-2002 level, only about two hundred cases would have been filed monthly. Id.
5
A petition for review is the means by which an agency order is appealed directly to a circuit court. FED. R.
APP. P. 15. Since 2005, it has been the only way a respondent in immigration proceedings can request
judicial review of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2010).
6
JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR Table B-3 (2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf
[hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009]. As of September 2009, 12,303 administrative agency appeals were
pending in the circuit courts. Id. at Table B-6. This contrasts to the 8446 appeals pending five years earlier,
which, at the time, already represented a 379% increase from the previous year. THIRD BRANCH, supra note
1.
7
As recently as August 2008, judges from the Second and Ninth Circuits “painted a bleak picture . . . of a
growing crisis in the adjudication of immigration cases . . . .” Tony Mauro, Circuit Judges Decry
Immigration Case ‘Tsunami,’ LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202423697849.
8
Two authors, both of whom were actively involved in the circuit’s new case management system, have
examined some of the consequences of the surge. See John R.B. Palmer, The Second Circuit’s “New
4
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This Article briefly describes the surge and the responses to it, assesses the current
situation, and, finally, reports on the initiatives to improve the immigration adjudication
process for which the surge can be held responsible. It will focus on the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, laden with the country’s second highest immigration docket,9
where the response to the surge was prompt, transformative, and effective. Although the
winds of change are in the air, the complexities of the immigration adjudication system
pose daunting obstacles to real reform. The response of federal judges to their burgeoning
and burdensome immigration caseloads has brought the sorry state of immigration
adjudication out of the shadows and exposed its imperfections, inefficiencies, and
inadequacies. This response demonstrates how pressures on the adjudication system may
bring about some welcome improvements.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE FLOOD
A. What Caused the Surge of Immigration Appeals?
After several years of experimentation, then Attorney General John Ashcroft
published a final rule “streamlining” the BIA procedures effective on September 25,
2002.10 For most of its existence, the Board had performed its critical appellate functions
Asylum Seekers”: Responses to an Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 965, 965 (2006)
(describing the consequences as “likely [to] reverberate throughout the entire system of immigration law”).
Mr. Palmer is one of the principal architects of the non-argument calendar, which he supervised for part of
its first year. Id. at 975 n.66; Elizabeth Cronin, When the Deluge Hits and You Never Saw the Storm:
Asylum Overload and the Second Circuit, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 549 (2007). Ms. Cronin is the Director
of the Office of Legal Affairs, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. at 547 n.a1. See
also Erick Rivero, Note, Asylum and Oral Argument: The Judiciary in Immigration and the Second Circuit
Non-Argument Calendar, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1497, 1521 (2006) (criticizing the non-argument calendar
on due process grounds).
9
The immigration caseload of all of the other circuits combined, excluding the Ninth, consistently is less
than the caseload in the Second. JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table B-3; see also Fed. Cts.
Comm. Rep., supra note 1, at 5; Tom Perrotta, Immigration Appeals Surge in Second Circuit, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 4, 2004, at 1, col. 4; Mark Hamblett, Circuit Struggles to Cope with Upsurge in Asylum Appeals, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 25, 2005, at 1, col. 3. The Ninth Circuit historically has the largest immigration docket. Its
administrative appeals caseload grew from 1063 in 2001, to a high of 6583 in 2005, then declined to a still
considerable 4625 cases in 2008. The comparison across this time period is a bit skewed because through
2004, appeals from the BIA were not separately reported. After the surge hit with full force, BIA appeals
were broken out from the total. This discrepancy is really not that significant, since less than 10% of these
appeals were from other agencies between 2005 and 2009. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2004 supra note
2, at Table B-3, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table B-3. In 2008, appeals from BIA
decisions in the Ninth Circuit, amounted to 45% of all BIA appeals. JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note
6, at Table B-3. Despite its enormous immigration caseload, the Ninth Circuit will not vacate oral argument
if any judge on a panel wants the case to be heard. 9TH CIR. R. 34-1 to 34-3 (advisory committee’s note).
10
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2010). The history and details of the streamlining initiative are described fully in
many sources: Palmer et al., supra note 1, at 23–29; John D. Ashcroft & Kris W. Kobach, A More Perfect
System: The 2002 Reforms of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 58 DUKE L.J. 1991, 1994–99 (2009);
Edward R. Grant, Laws of Unintended Consequences: IIRIRA and Other Unsung Contributors to the
Current State of Immigration Litigation, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 923, 945–52 (2006) (The author is a BIA
Member.); Michael M. Hethmon, Tsunami Watch on the Coast of Bohemia: The BIA Streamlining Reforms
and Judicial Review of Expulsion Orders, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 999, 1004–06 (2006); Fact Sheet, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, supra note 4; DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR: THE AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO, RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
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sitting in three-member panels. With the exception of a few non-mandatory categories of
cases, the streamlining regulations created a new norm of single-member panels and
changed the standard of review of immigration court fact-finding from de novo to
“clearly erroneous.”11 Post-streamlining, the single-member panel could, and actually
was prompted to, write affirmances without opinion (AWO) in the majority of cases.
Although the goal of the new regime was to reduce a crushing backlog, it reduced the
size of the Board from twenty-three to eleven members. This encouraged the use of
expedient one-member review and single-sentence decisions simply to keep up with the
pace of incoming cases.
The timing of the surge, right on the heels of the BIA streamlining regulations,
implies an inescapable and, to this day, unrefuted cause-and-effect relationship.12 This
outcome was hardly unexpected. As early as 2003, a backlog in the circuit courts was
building up due to the loss of meaningful agency review.13 Ashcroft even conceded,
“Although the streamlining reforms had indeed increased the caseload of the U.S. courts
of appeals, such an increase was inevitable if the [BIA] backlog was ever to be
resolved.”14
The new regulations had an impact on both the quality and balance of the BIA’s
product. Post-streamlining, a sizable portion of decisions were single-member summary
orders affirming the immigration court’s order of removal. The United States
Government and Accountability Office (GAO) found that AWOs rose from 44% to 77%
over a four-year period.15 These cursory AWOs were essentially barren of any reasoning
or analysis, often making judicial review dependent on the record in immigration court.
Even single-judge decisions were sparsely reasoned. The effect of the regulations on
outcomes was even more dramatic. Prior to 2002, one out of four BIA appeals was
granted, whereas after that date only one in ten was granted.16 The impact of moving
from a panel to a single judge was similar: three-member panels favored noncitizens in
52% of the cases while single-judge decisions had an approval rate of only 7%.17

APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 16–30 (2003), available at
http://www.dorsey.com/files/Publication/e649960f-30c0-408f-89650df604f69523/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/690ec02a-94b9-4115-a1a05d14cf0d7a6d/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf. [hereinafter DORSEY & WHITNEY].
11
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2010).
12
See Fed. Cts. Comm. Rep. supra note 1, at 1–4. DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 40–41; A.B.A.
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE & PRO BONO, SEEKING MEANINGFUL REVIEW: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO DORSEY & WHITNEY STUDY OF BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
PROCEDURAL REFORMS 2–3 (2003), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publicserv/immigration/bia.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter A.B.A. COMM’N].
13
DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 39.
14
Ashcroft & Kobach, supra note 10, at 2004. Another apologist of the streamlining regulations argues that
the federal appeals courts are partly responsible for their own crisis. Hethmon, supra note 10, at 1001.
15
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM
OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES (Sept. 2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The decrease in the percentage of
BIA asylum decisions favoring the alien occurred in both affirmative and defensive cases, and the
decreases were significantly greater for those who applied defensively. Id. at 10.
16
DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 40.
17
GAO REPORT, supra note 15, at 10.
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BIA streamlining eroded the confidence of the federal courts in the fairness,
accuracy, and quality of the administrative process at both the immigration court and BIA
levels.18 By abrogating the prior practice of thorough appellate review, the BIA failed to
narrow issues, carefully analyze the factual record, or make apparent the legal standards
applied. Without clear analysis, the federal courts had to look at the record of proceedings
at the immigration court without the benefit of an adequate appellate review filter. In
many cases, the circuit courts engaged in a two-tiered inquiry resulting in a series of rules
regarding the nature of the review required.19 Federal judges had to dig into the facts
developed in the immigration court record since so many appeals in asylum cases involve
mixed questions of law and fact, and the review by the BIA was neither clear nor
dispositive.20 This placed an extra burden on circuit courts to make determinations on
issues of fact, including credibility findings, rather than concentrating on their main
function of deciding questions of law.
Additional, albeit less directly influential, factors played a role in causing the surge.
First, litigation in the aftermath of many new and complex changes contained in the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)21
inevitably contributed to some increase in judicial review as new proceedings were
challenged and the BIA and the courts interpreted new statutory provisions.22 Second, the
18

See ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 182 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010)
(attributing to one Ninth Circuit judge the comment that streamlining had “eviscerated the BIA’s ability to
carry out its administrative functions”).
19
If the BIA issues an independent decision that does not adopt an immigration judge’s (IJ) reasoning, the
court of appeals will review the BIA opinion alone. Belortaja v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 619, 622–23 (2d Cir.
2007) (quoting Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2005)). More often,
however, the BIA’s affirmance relates back to the immigration court’s rationale, but is ambiguous and thus
necessitates review of both the BIA opinion and the immigration court record. Here are some of the Second
Circuit’s standards of review:
• When the BIA summarily affirms the IJ’s decision without issuing an opinion, the
court reviews the IJ’s determination as the final analysis. See, e.g., Bennett v.
Mukasey, 300 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2008); Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 66 (2d
Cir. 2007); Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2005).
• When the BIA adopts and supplements the IJ’s decision, the circuit court reviews the
IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See, e.g., Delgado v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d
702, 705 (2d Cir. 2007).
• When the BIA affirms an immigration court decision in some respects but not others,
the appellate court also reviews the IJ’s decision. However, the review is confined to
those reasons for denying relief that were adopted by the BIA. See, e.g., Yang v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005).
• When the BIA does not expressly adopt an IJ’s decision, but the Board’s opinion
closely tracks the IJ’s reasoning, the appeals court considers both the IJ’s and the
BIA’s opinions for the sake of completeness. See, e.g., Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d
524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).
20
Even though the federal courts are very deferential in reviewing an IJ’s credibility determination, they
will remand if it is based on flawed reasoning, faulty fact finding or impermissible speculation. See Hu v.
Holder, 579 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2009).
21
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30,
1996). “Massive changes in immigration law . . . required review of many questions of first impression and
development of case law to resolve complex statutory interpretation questions.” A.B.A. COMM’N, supra
note 12, at 3.
22
DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 19. Examples of these issues include the repeal of previously
available forms of relief leaving immigrants no option other than to raise legal challenges to statutory terms
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most extensive empirical study on the early years of the surge, conducted by John
Palmer, Steven Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin, explored other explanations as well,
most notably a basic change in immigration law practice.23 The study argues that the
transfer of the action from the BIA to the Courts of Appeals caused immigration lawyers
to recalibrate their practice to concentrate on federal appeals, whereas previously they
had only handled immigration matters at the administrative level.24 Palmer and his coauthors posit that immigration law has gained legitimacy in the academy, that the number
of immigration lawyers has expanded, and that immigration practice as a whole, more
litigious in the face of draconian statutes, has increasingly moved from the backwater
administrative agency to the well-respected federal courts for meaningful review.25
Writing at roughly the same time, Lenni Benson suggests that attorneys have come to
recognize the strategic value of filing petitions for review as a means of educating the
circuit courts, negotiating for a stipulated settlement with a government lawyer, or
obtaining a remand.26 More recently, Benson asserted that the “largest contributing factor
to the increase in judicial review is a growth in the number of private attorneys willing to
prepare a petition for review.”27
The population of lawyers filing petitions for review has also changed since the
2005 Palmer report. Many more firms and individual attorneys are handling cases. Of the
1113 notices of appearance filed on immigration cases before the Second Circuit in 2009,
few lawyers handled more than one or two cases.28 No nonprofit organization, legal
services office, law school clinic, or other pro bono counsel handled more than four
appeals. A significant number of lawyers continued to file petitions for multiple clients:

and the preclusion of judicial review of discretionary decisions leading to litigation on the question of the
characterization of a ruling. Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review
and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
37, 46, 49–52 (2006).
23
Palmer et al., Surge in Petitions, supra note 1, at 93–94; Palmer, supra note 1, at 14–15.
24
Palmer et al., Surge in Petitions, supra note 1, at 93–94.
25
Id. at 85–90; see also Palmer, supra note 1, at 29–30.
26
Benson, supra note 22, at 53.
27
Lenni Benson, You Can’t Get There from Here: Managing Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 2007
U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 405, 424 (2007). Second Circuit Chief Judge John Walker confirmed this conclusion
when he reported that: “We expected that most of these petitions [immigration appeals] would be pro se.
However, 80 percent of the petitioners are represented by legal counsel.” CHIEF JUDGES’ REPORTS OF THE
SECOND CIRCUIT, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, ANNUAL REPORT 2005,
available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Reports/05/2005%20Annual%20Report%20%20FINAL.htm#UNITED%20STATES%20COURT%20OF%20APPEALS%20FOR%20THE%20SECO
ND%20CIRCUIT.
28
On October 29, 2010, the Clerk of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals compiled a list of all notices of
appearance filed on immigration petitions for review. The table below is drawn from that information for
2009.
Number of Cases per Attorney Number of Attorneys Handling this Number of Cases
60+
3
40–60
0
30–40
2
20–30
2
10–20
15
5–10
27
(Information on file with author).
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Forty-six lawyers represented more than five clients, while three lawyers astonishingly
handled more than sixty appeals.
A quick look at the immigration cases decided by the Second Circuit in the single
month of June 2009 offers an even clearer picture of the trend of dispersing
representation among more lawyers.29 During that month, approximately 130 different
lawyers were counsel of record for the petitioners in the 150 immigration cases decided
by the court. Very few lawyers appeared on more than a single case. It seems that the
New York immigration bar has developed a culture in which lawyers regularly seek
federal court review, contributing to the endurance of the surge.
The surge has also altered the government’s approach to immigration appeals.
Crushed by the volume of cases in the Second Circuit, local assistant United States
attorneys (AUSA), who had traditionally handled immigration matters, could no longer
manage the caseload. In a major shift of responsibility, by May 2006, the Department of
Justice Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) represented the government on cases filed
in the Second Circuit, reflecting an important transfer of resources from the overburdened
U.S. Attorney’s Office to the centralized Department of Justice (DOJ) immigration
specialists.30 While this change may increase efficiency by centralizing and standardizing
litigation due to the DOJ’s immigration expertise, a high-volume centralized practice may
actually inhibit the kind of discretionary decisions that occur with more individualized,
localized case handling that helps to reduce the caseload by stipulation or other
settlement.31
By the end of the decade, the panic over the surge had subsided, and for good
reason. Although filings were still high, the backlog was under greater control as a
consequence of aggressive court management measures.32 To achieve this, the Second
Circuit radically transformed its practices. Although the new system prompted a few
reservations concerning its potential for unfairness in light of the high volume of cases,
there were no significant voices of protest or objection.33
29

June 2009 also marked the beginning of this writing project. I closely examined the 150 immigration
cases decided between June 1, 2009 and June 30, 2009, looking at factors such as the result, whether a
published or summary order was used, the judges on each panel, the lawyers, and the issue(s) in each case.
I will refer to this month as a small-scale exemplar again in subpart II.B.2 of this Article.
30
Elizabeth Cronin, Immigration Practice in the Second Circuit: From Filing to Oral Argument and
Everything in Between, in DEFENDING IMMIGRATION REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 2009 229, 232–33 n.6
(Practicing Law Inst. 2009).
31
The increase in appeals also may be attributable to a lack of prosecutorial discretion that might, if
properly exercised, eliminate the need to file a petition for review in the first place. Benson, supra note 27,
at 425–26. While the government may have been a victim of the surge in terms of its capacity to handle the
volume of cases, it has not been an innocent or passive victim. Although the government is not responsible
for filing petitions for review, its litigation posture can contribute to the flow by taking intransigent
adversarial positions. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Immigration Law 2006, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 905, 913
(2006); see, e.g., Pareja v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 615 F.3d 180, 186 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (chastising
the government attorney for deficiencies in the brief). It is impossible to gauge the effect that prosecutorial
discretion could or does have on the courts of appeals since there seems to be no method for tracking cases
in which no judicial action occurs. Thus, if the government consents to a remand, that case cannot be
counted in the court’s decision statistics of published opinions or summary orders.
32
“The Court is now not only adjudicating enough immigration appeals to prevent the accumulation of a
backlog, it has already shrunk the existing immigration backlog . . . a 37% decrease in just eight months
[October 1, 2005 to May 31, 2005].” Palmer, supra note 8, at 976.
33
See, e.g., Rivero, supra note 8, at 1521–24.
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B. Leveling Off to a “New Normal”
1. The Life Preservers: Court Management Solutions

The surge affected all circuits to some degree, but the two most dramatically
swamped were the Second34 and the Ninth.35 The Second Circuit responded to its
overwhelming immigration caseload with a significant structural change to its core
principles and operations.
After several unsuccessful efforts to regain control, including meetings with senior
representatives of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), the court
implemented a local rule creating a Non-Argument Calendar (NAC) for all cases seeking
review of a claim for asylum and related relief. A quick process of deliberation and
implementation took place between May 2005 and October 3, 2005 when the new rule
went into effect.36 Under the new rule, those appealing denials of asylum and related
relief are not entitled to oral argument in the ordinary course.37 This was a radical change

34

The immigration caseload of the Second Circuit amounts to 21.6% of all appeals from the BIA. JUDICIAL
BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table B-3; Perrotta, supra note 9; Hamblett, supra note 9.
35
Without question, the court of appeals most drastically affected is the Ninth, the Circuit with the largest
immigration caseload historically. Its administrative caseload grew from 1063 in 2001, to a high of 6583 in
2005, then declined to a still considerable 3351 cases in 2009. Compare JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR Table B-3 (2006),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness2006.aspx [hereinafter
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2006], with JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table B-3. See supra text
accompanying note 9. In 2009, appeals from BIA decisions in the Ninth Circuit (3351) amounted to
approximately 45% of all BIA appeals (7518). JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table B-3.
Although both circuits employ case management mechanisms to cope with their crushing immigration
dockets, the Ninth built on a well-established system that permits the court’s staff to screen cases of all
types. This Article focuses on the Second Circuit, but for a more detailed description of the Ninth Circuit’s
case inventory system, see LAW, supra note 18, at 158–66. See also Michael Corradini, The Role of the
Circuit Courts in Refugee Adjudication: A Comparison of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, 23 GEO. IMMIG.
L.J. 201, 213–16 (2008). In brief, the Ninth Circuit engages in substantial triage-like screening, which has
expanded since the surge. Local court rules presumptively disfavor publication, 9TH CIR. R. 36-2, so that in
2009, 87.9% of the court’s decisions were unpublished. JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table S3. Since publication apparently “increases the likelihood that certain judges vote in favor of asylum,” more
cases affirm the denial of relief. David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and
Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CINN. L. REV. 817, 820 (2005). After interviewing Ninth Circuit
judges, one author concluded that the court’s “coping strategy” may have helped manage the exploding
caseload, but in doing so, may have also resulted in a less thorough and less careful scrutiny of the screened
cases. Anna O. Law, Rationing Justice?: The Effect of Caseload Pressures on the U.S. Court of Appeal in
Immigration Cases 47 (2010), http://works.bepress.com/anna_law/1 [hereinafter Law, Rationing Justice].
36
See Jon O. Newman, The Second Circuit’s Expedited Adjudication of Asylum Cases: A Case Study of a
Judicial Response to an Unprecedented Problem of Caseload Management, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 432–
35 (2009).
37
The Rule states:
(a) Subject Proceedings. The court maintains a Non-Argument Calendar (NAC) for the
following classes of cases
(1) Immigration. An appeal or petition for review, and any related motion, in
which a party seeks review of the denial of:
(A) a claim for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA);
(B) a claim for withholding of removal under the INA;
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to a venerable tradition: “The Second Circuit has prided itself as the last remaining circuit
to afford oral argument to all litigants, with the exception of prisoners whose cases have
been deemed of insufficient merit to warrant appointment of counsel.”38
Under the new regime, approximately forty-eight new filings are assigned to the
NAC weekly. Each of the four three-judge panels convened per week is given twelve
cases with the goal of prompt resolution within a few weeks.39 Oral argument in asylum
cases will occur only at the discretion of the judges. Non-asylum immigration cases are
not affected by the rule and would be scheduled for oral argument, although these cases
too might result in a summary order. It is likely that the circuit’s judges consider the
alleviation of the burdensome caseload to be worth the sacrifice of oral argument because
the majority of asylum appeals raise claims of error due to improper evidentiary analysis
by the hearing judge, requiring a heavily fact-based review of the written record rather
than rulings on novel or unsettled legal issues that might benefit from the give-and-take
of argument.
To support the NAC, the circuit created the Immigration Unit of the Staff
Attorneys’ Office [SAO] in the Office of Legal Affairs, with authority to hire a
supervisor and twelve staff attorneys.40 The staff attorneys are not judicial law clerks and
their office is not in the courthouse. They prepare bench memoranda on petitions for
review on asylum claims that are then referred to the court’s non-argument calendar.
After reviewing a SAO memorandum, the panel assigned to the case generally issues an
unpublished summary order.41 The NAC benefits from the professionalism of the staff
attorneys whose memorandum may often be “more insightful and comprehensive” than
the briefs or arguments of counsel.42
Without oral argument and with the screening assistance of the SAC, the output of
the court has been prodigious, relying heavily on unpublished summary orders that do not
have precedential authority.43 As Table 1 illustrates, the absolute number of summary
orders almost doubled between 2002 and 2008. While the Court issues summary orders in
other matters also, immigration cases dominate the unpublished decisions. Over time, the
number of signed opinions also has risen but has never exceeded 525. Meanwhile, the
number of summary orders has more than doubled, reaching almost 3000 in 2006, the
(C) a claim for withholding or deferral of removal under the
Convention Against Torture; or
(D) a motion to reopen or reconsider an order involving one of the
claims listed above.
(2) Other. Any other class of cases that the court identifies as appropriate for the
NAC.
(b) Placement. The clerk identifies a proceeding for placement on the NAC and, as soon
as practicable, informs the parties.
(c) Oral Argument. A proceeding on the NAC is decided without oral argument unless
the court orders otherwise.
2D CIR. LOCAL R. § 34.2. Non-Argument Calendar.
38
Newman, supra note 36, at 433.
39
Id. at 434; Palmer, supra note 8, at 975.
40
Cronin, supra note 8, at 555.
41
Palmer, supra note 8, at 975–76.
42
Newman, supra note 36, at 436.
43
“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other
written dispositions that have been: (i) designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘nonprecedential,’
‘not precedent,’ or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.” FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
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first full year that the SAO tackled the backlog. The percentage of summary orders has
also increased significantly.
Table 1: Second Circuit—Methods of Rendering Decisions44
Year

Total Decisions

Signed Opinions Number
(% of total)

Summary Orders Number
(% of total)

2002

1411

342 (24.2)

1062 (75.3)

2003

1481

381 (25.7)

1028 (69.4)

2004

1533

446 (29.1)

1001 (65.3)

2005

1921

525 (27.3)

1321 (68.8)

2006

3479

505 (14.5)

2871 (82.5)

2007

2441

366 (15.0)

1987 (81.4)

2008

2631

415 (15.8)

2108 (80.1)

The NAC has celebrated its sixth anniversary and deserves credit for rescuing the
circuit from drowning. It has helped the court render more decisions and leave fewer
cases pending. While the circuit does issue a significant number of immigration
published decisions on non-asylum matters, the vast majority of asylum cases are decided
by summary order from the NAC.
2. Inside the Lifeboat: An Even Closer Look at the Second Circuit
Between 2002 and 2008, the number of appeals filed from BIA decisions
skyrocketed from 533 to 2865,45 steadily increasing after a mind-boggling one-year jump
of 290% (1548 cases) between 2002 and 2003.46 In 2009, that number dropped to 1624, a
decrease for which some explanations will be suggested below. Even with this drop, in
2009, 22% of all federal immigration appeals were filed in the Second Circuit.47 This
circuit has jurisdiction over matters conducted in the New York immigration courts
where filings historically exceed those in the immigration courts of all circuits other than
the Ninth.48 Table 2 illustrates the growth of the Second Circuit’s immigration docket.
44

See Second Circuit Annual Report Statistics, 2003–2008, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/annualreports.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012); see also JUDICIAL
BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table S-3 (reporting that 89.2% of the Second Circuit decisions are
unpublished).
45
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table B-3; JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2006, supra note 35, at Table
B-3; JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2004, supra note 2, at Table B-3.
46
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2006, supra note 35, at Table B-3. Judge Jon O. Newman provides an insider’s
account of the breathtaking increase in the number of immigration cases pending in the Second Circuit,
almost all of which involved asylum claims. Newman, supra note 36, at 431.
47
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table B-3. After 2004, cases were designated as BIA appeals.
Prior to that, the category was administrative appeals so the figures are distorted by the inclusion of a small
number of non-BIA cases.
48
New York’s immigration court presides over 25% of all immigration proceedings. The Second Circuit
also has jurisdiction over cases heard in the immigration courts of Batavia, Buffalo, and Hartford, as well
as courts located in three detention or correctional facilities. See Executive Office for Immigration Review,
EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm
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Table 2: Second Circuit Immigration Appeals Filed from BIA Decisions, FY 2001–200949
Date-FY
BIA

‘01
184

‘02
533

‘03
2081

‘04
2632

‘05
2550

‘06
2640

‘07
2177

‘08
2865

‘09
1624

Filings are not the only symptom of the crisis; the size of the backlog of pending
cases is another. The NAC and the SAO are responsible for harnessing the burgeoning
caseload with skyrocketing productivity. In 2009, 2448 administrative appeals were
terminated.50 A Lexis search for immigration cases appealed from the BIA decided
during that time period turned up 1380 opinions issued by the Second Circuit in the
Federal Reporter and the Federal Appendix combined. Of those, fifty-four were
published decisions; the balance consisted of summary orders with short unpublished
opinions.
The new rule and the NAC are entrenched by now, and have alleviated the burden
placed on the court by its immigration caseload. This section will examine the recent
situation in 2009 from both a year-long and month-long vantage point, providing a more
detailed impression of this progress. To begin, an overview of the cases in 2009 reveals
some patterns and categories. The following typology of issues appears to be common to
both calendars:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Was the proper legal standard used?
Was the correct legal standard properly applied to the facts?
Was there an inadequate record or was the consideration of issues
incomplete?
Was a negative credibility finding supported by evidence?
Is there a need for the BIA to consider and/or clarify an agency
position before the court will make a ruling?
Is a previous agency interpretation entitled to deference?
Is there a statutory bar to review or was there insufficient exhaustion?

Immigration cases run a wide gamut and even the small number of cases resulting
in published decisions reflected this diversity. Some published cases arose in the context
of removal proceedings based on criminal convictions, sometimes requiring statutory
interpretation, while others related to forms of relief such as waivers, cancellation of
removal, or citizenship claims.51 A handful involved jurisdictional questions.52
(last visited Sept. 28, 2011). “Twenty-Six Federal Plaza [the principal court in New York City] is an
extremely busy court.” Noel Brennan, A View from the Immigration Bench, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 624
(2009). Immigration Judge Brennan estimates that each of the twenty-five judges carries 1000 cases on his
or her docket, the majority of which are asylum matters. Id.
49
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table B-3; JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2006, supra note 35, at Table
B-3; JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2004, supra note 2, at Table B-3.
50
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table B-6. Again, BIA cases account for the majority of the
administrative appeals.
51
See, e.g., Rotimi v. Holder, 577 F.3d 133, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (addressing question of eligibility for
waiver of conviction under INA § 212(h)); Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778, 790 (2d Cir. 2009)
(addressing eligibility for cancellation of removal); Lanferman v. B.I.A., 576 F.3d 84, 88–93 (2d Cir. 2009)
(analyzing the BIA’s interpretation of criminal statute regarding firearm offenses); Pierre v. Holder, 588
F.3d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that petitioner was denied due process when BIA found her
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Although most asylum cases are adjudicated on the NAC, about one-third of the
published Second Circuit immigration opinions in 2009 were asylum-related.53 This
suggests that quite a number of asylum cases are moved from the NAC because they
warrant greater scrutiny and more authoritative resolutions. Several published decisions
raised legal questions related to the definition of a refugee or to bars to relief.54 Several
concerned the adequacy of the immigration judge’s (IJ) credibility determination.55 A few
cases found that the BIA had engaged in impermissible fact-finding.56 On the surface, it
is not always obvious why particular asylum cases are transferred from their presumptive
berth on the NAC to the regular argument calendar (RAC), since the local rule does not
require the judges to explain this decision. Their most obvious common denominator,
however, is their high rate of remand.
A close-up single-month snapshot provides a more focused impression of the
court’s quantitative and qualitative workload.57 In June 2009, the Second Circuit issued
305 decisions in total, a sizeable increase in output over prior monthly dockets.58 Out of
these, 150 were petitions for review of removal orders (49.3%). Of the 305 cases, only
thirty-five full decisions were published. The NAC released 270 summary orders (71.4%
of all decisions) of which 147 (54.4%) arose from removal orders based on a denial of
asylum and/or related relief, or motions to reopen or reconsider these orders based on

removable as an aggravated felon); De Johnson v. Holder, 564 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2009); Garcia-Padron v.
Holder, 558 F.3d 196, 201–04 (2d Cir. 2009) (addressing petitioner’s eligibility for waiver of
inadmissibility under INA § 212(c)).
52
See, e.g., Chupina v. Holder, 570 F.3d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 2009) (no jurisdiction without final removal
order); Contreras-Salinas v. Holder, 585 F.3d 710, 713–14 (2d Cir. 2009) (no jurisdiction to review
discretionary decision of agency).
53
This approximation is based on a review on LEXIS of all 2009 published decisions in appeals from the
BIA.
54
See, e.g.¸ Lin v. Holder, 584 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2009); Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 515 (2d Cir. 2009)
(finding the persecutor bar did not apply to the facts); Liao v. Holder, 558 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2009)
(remanding for determination about firm resettlement); Wang v. Holder, 583 F.3d 86, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2009)
(selling body parts constitutes “serious non-political crime”).
55
See, e.g., Hu v. Holder, 579 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanded); Zheng v. Holder, 349 F. App’x
619, 621 (2d Cir. 2009); Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 214 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that substantial
evidence did not support adverse credibility finding).
56
See, e.g., Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 322–23 (2d Cir. 2009); Guzman v. Holder, 568 F.3d 61, 63
(2d Cir. 2009), vacated, 340 F. App’x 679 (2d Cir. 2009); Lin v. Holder, 347 F. App’x 716, 718–19 (2d
Cir. 2009).
57
According to the Immigration Law Advisor, the EOIR in-house newsletter, in the month of June 2009,
the eleven circuits decided 395 BIA appeals, 250 of which were opinions issued by the Second (148) and
the Ninth (102) Circuits. Forty-four of the 395 cases were reversed: twenty-nine in the Ninth, six cases in
the Second, four in the Third, two each in the Fifth and Eleventh and one in the Eighth. No cases were
reversed in the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, or Tenth Circuits. John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court
Decisions for June 2009, IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, July 2009, at 6, available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA-Newsleter/ILA%202009/vol3no7.pdf.
58
There are some small discrepancies among the various sources of data. This number, 150, which slightly
deviates from the BIA count, was derived from the court’s own website where both opinions and summary
orders are posted daily. See Decisions, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/opinions.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
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new factual or legal developments.59 Only seven petitions for review in immigration
matters were granted and remanded, two on the RAC and five on the NAC.
Figure 1: June 2009—Distribution of Published and Summary Order Cases

Of the thirty-five published opinions issued by the court in June 2009, only three
(8.5%) were immigration matters.60 One was dismissed on procedural grounds.61 The
second was remanded because the BIA engaged in impermissible fact-finding in a
cancellation of removal application.62 In the third, Baba v. Holder, the circuit concluded
that both the IJ and BIA committed error when each concluded as a matter of law that the
mistreatment about which Baba testified did not rise to the level of persecution.63 This
decision expressed serious concern with the proceedings below and contained a detailed
analysis of how the prior adjudicators misapplied the legal standard.
The number of published immigration cases only amounted to a small fraction of
the court’s output in June 2009, yet the court found error committed by either the IJ or the
BIA in two-thirds of them. The near-total success of immigration petitioners whose cases
are published may be strong evidence that the system is working effectively for the
massive number of asylum cases since the court identified for published decision matters
that raise issues warranting more than summary consideration.
Of the court’s 150 immigration-related cases decided in June 2009, 147 (99.1%)
were decided by summary order. All but five of the summary orders either denied or
dismissed the petition for review, representing an affirmance remand rate of 96.6%. The
vast difference in output demonstrates the capacity of the NAC to dispose of what the
court considers to be routine asylum cases. A comparison of the issues raised in the
asylum cases on the NAC where the court remanded to the BIA, as well as the quality of
59

Id. It is possible that a summary order might be issued in a case other than asylum. See, e.g., Canales v.
U.S.C.I.S., 346 F. App’x 668, 669 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order issued for appeal from denial of an
application for cancellation of removal).
60
The opinion in a fourth case, Mahmood v. Holder, 562 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2009), was amended on June 25
so it appears on the circuit’s decision list for that month. Mahmood was remanded in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008).
61
Chupina v. Holder, 570 F.3d 99, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2009) (no final order of removal). Although the court
dismissed on procedural grounds, it left open the possibility that were the petitioner to properly exhaust his
administrative remedies, the court would reconsider aspects of his claim. Id. at 105.
62
Guzman v. Holder, 568 F.3d 61, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2009).
63
569 F.3d 79, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2009).
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the decisions themselves, suggests that the court is capable of culling meritorious claims
from the mass of NAC cases. But without a thorough examination of the entire record on
appeal of every NAC petition, it is impossible to determine whether or not the court
overlooked other viable claims.
In three of the successful cases, the court remanded to the agency because it had not
properly applied its own standards. One case, Xia v. Holder, involved the insertion of an
intrauterine device (IUD) against the will of a Chinese woman.64 The BIA previously had
held that insertion of an IUD was not persecution per se without other aggravating
circumstances, such as resistance.65 Even though the circuit itself had not decided this
issue, the court remanded it because the BIA’s ground for affirming was “insufficient to
permit meaningful review.”66 In another coerced population-control case, the agency had
not applied its own standards in determining whether the petitioner belonged to the
particular social group of “over-birth” children in China.67 The panel remanded to the
BIA for a determination whether this group qualified under the refugee standard and for a
clearer explanation of its determination as well as its reasoning for finding that the harms
she faced were not on account of her social-group membership.68 In the third Chinese
asylum case, this one based on religious persecution, the court found the record of
changed country conditions insufficient to rebut the regulatory presumption of a wellfounded fear of persecution since the judge had concluded that he did suffer from past
persecution.69
In the fourth remanded summary order, the court agreed with the BIA’s conclusion
that the Ivorian petitioner had not suffered past persecution, but found that the Board’s
analysis regarding his well-founded fear of future persecution was legally flawed because
it ignored significant facts and country conditions evidence.70
The fifth remanded summary order concerned the agency’s credibility
determination.71 This is an area in which the court has written with increasing frequency,
creating considerable jurisprudence on standards for reviewing credibility.72 These
standards have guided the non-precedential summary orders that, more often than not, are
rooted in a challenge to the credibility assessment. Most of the time, cases challenging
the IJ credibility determination land on the NAC, which usually finds that there was
substantial evidence to support an adverse credibility finding. In June 2009, it did so in
forty-six cases. In one case, however, the court deviated from this pattern. In Zheng v.
Dep’t of Homeland Security, the court conducted a detailed analysis of the basis for the
IJ’s negative credibility finding. It concluded that the IJ erred by relying on records that
64

Xia v. Holder, 330 F. App’x 277, 278–79 (2d Cir. 2009).
In re M-F-W & L-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 633, 638 (B.I.A. 2008).
66
Xia, 330 F. App’x at 279 (citing Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2006)).
67
Chen v. Holder, 335 F. App’x 114, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2009).
68
Id. at 116.
69
Huang v. Holder, 330 F. App’x 275, 276 (2d Cir. 2009).
70
Sangare v. Holder, 330 F. App’x 320, 321–323 (2d Cir. 2009).
71
Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 332 F. App’x 696, 698–700 (2d Cir. 2009).
72
For example, in Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit adopted a “totality
of the circumstances” test post-REAL ID Act that abrogated the nexus requirement of its earlier significant
credibility precedential decision. In that earlier case, Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir.
2003), an IJ must set forth “specific, cogent reasons” that bear a “legitimate nexus” to the credibility
determination which itself may not be based on “speculation or conjecture.” See also Palmer, supra note 8,
at 984–88.
65
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had not been admitted into evidence to establish inconsistencies with the respondent’s
testimony, by overstating the respondent’s failure to provide corroborating evidence, and
by “an insupportable misreading of a letter from respondent’s father.”73
From studying this monthly inventory, some other facts and patterns emerge that
contribute to a better understanding of the court’s docket. The petitioners in fifty-three
cases were Chinese nationals.74 In most cases, the court found that the IJ and the BIA
committed no error either in applying the asylum standards (thirty cases) or in judging the
sufficiency of evidence or credibility (forty-six cases). Many cases reflected some
inadequacies in representation. For example, in at least fourteen cases, the petitioner did
not properly raise or preserve a claim, or properly exhaust administrative remedies. On
the other hand, only two cases raised ineffective assistance of counsel as part of the
claim; neither case was successful. Finally, a large number of cases (fifty-eight) arose
following a denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider; in all of them, the court found
either no abuse of discretion, or that the motion was untimely, or both.
The numbers above show how the circuit has altered its practices in order to
survive the surge. Its revised case management organization affects at least 50% of all
petitions for review, and almost all of those filed in immigration matters. This regime
heavily routinizes these cases by utilizing court staff as screeners, dispensing with oral
argument, and issuing summary orders. These efficiency measures have potential costs
on the quality and individuality of the decision-making process. Despite these risks, the
court appears to be dealing responsibly and fairly with the caseload and has authored
considerable amounts of significant jurisprudence on a wide range of immigration
issues.75 Any fear that the quality of decision making would deteriorate has not been
realized, judging, at least, from the relative silence and lack of complaint from the
immigration advocacy community in response to the output of the NAC and the SAO.76

73

Zheng, 332 F. App’x at 699.
Other countries scattered throughout the calendar included Bangladesh (3), Malaysia (1), Montenegro
(2), Indonesia (2), Albania (3), Ecuador (1), Uzbekistan (2), Dem. Rep. of Congo (1), Haiti (1), Sri Lanka
(1), Cameroon (1), Guinea (3), Liberia (1), Jamaica (1), India (1), Mali (1), Dominican Republic (1),
Guatemala (1), Pakistan (1), Côte d’Ivoire (1), Sierra Leone (2), Egypt (1), Belarus (1), Nepal (1), and
Russia (1).
75
In 2009, for example, the court considered issues relating to the classification of a crime as an aggravated
felony, see, e.g., Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767, 767 (2d Cir. 2009), and Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778,
778 (2d Cir. 2009); recognized the court’s power to interpret the “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” standard for cancellation of removal in some circumstances, see, e.g., Mendez v. Holder, 566
F.3d 316, 322 (2d Cir. 2009); and addressed the applicability of certain bars to asylum, see, e.g., Weng v.
Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513–16 (2d Cir. 2009), and Lin v. Holder, 584 F.3d 75, 79–82 (2d Cir. 2009) (the
persecutor bar); Wang v. Holder, 583 F.3d 86, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2009) (the serious non-political crime bar);
Liao v. Holder, 558 F.3d 152, 157–59 (2d Cir. 2009) (the firm resettlement bar).
76
But see Law, Rationing Justice, supra note 35, at 38. Writing about screening panels in the Ninth Circuit,
Law fears that they raise “the risk of missing routine[-]looking cases that may have complex legal issues
buried, taxes the cognitive functions of the judges because of the repetitive nature of the bundled cases, and
can stew the eventual outcome of the cases by limiting the level of judicial scrutiny an appeal receives.” Id.
74
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III. SIGHTING LAND
A. The Tide of Appeals Is Subsiding

The court management adjustments motivated by the daunting caseload allowed for
greater efficiency, but the surge of appeals seems destined to be a permanent condition.
Although filings fluctuated a bit, they remained extraordinarily high until this past year.
In FY 2009, the number of immigration appeals filed nationwide decreased noticeably
from 10,280 in 2008 to 7518 and continue to drop.77 In the Second Circuit, filings
declined from 2865 in 2008 to 1624; in the Ninth, from 4625 to 3351.78
This decrease raises many questions. Why is the number of appeals declining? Are
the reasons for the falling-off mirror images of the reasons for the surge? Are there new
developments in the immigration picture that are trickling into the adjudication process,
or is the process itself changing? If the tidal wave is subsiding, what has it left in its
wake?
The next section will attempt to answer these questions, but the newness of this
development renders definitive conclusions premature and elusive. Four recent
developments may account for the sharp decline of federal appeals: 1) an overall drop in
immigration court cases, resulting in a concomitant decline in appeals filed at the board;
2) a significant decrease in asylum denials and a concurrent increase in the level of
representation at immigration court proceedings on asylum cases; 3) an ever-growing
backlog of case completions in immigration court that slows down the entire process; and
4) an increase in detained cases. Taken together, they provide a powerful causal account.
1. A System-Wide Decline
The immigration adjudication process begins in the fifty-eight immigration courts
nationwide that handle approximately one-quarter of a million cases annually. The vast
majority of these cases are removal proceedings,79 of which about 80% result in IJ
decisions, either oral or written.80 In the five-year period between 2005 and 2009, EOIR
statistics show a drop in the number and percent of IJ decisions appealed to the BIA.81
The fairly low rate of appeals to the board does not signify satisfaction with the result of
immigration proceedings. The huge gap between the caseloads of the board versus the
courts is more likely because most individuals in proceedings do not request relief, thus
they have no basis for appealing.82 Only those respondents for whom the immigration
court proceeding results in an order of removal would appeal an IJ decision; respondents
77

In testimony on May 18, 2011, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, EOIR Director Juan P. Osuna
stated, “Overall, the number of BIA appeals going to the federal courts today are about half what they were
at the high-water mark in 2005.” Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the Immigration Court
System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Juan P. Osuna,
Director, Executive Office For Immigration Review), available at
www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2011/EOIRtestimony05182011.pdf [hereinafter Osuna Statement].
78
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at Table B-3.
79
FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
C3, Table 3 (2010).
80
Id. at D1, Fig. 4.
81
Id. at Y1, Fig. 32.
82
In FY 2009, respondents in 76% of all immigration proceedings, 290, 233 cases, filed no applications for
relief. Id. at N1.
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receiving relief obviously are not going to appeal a favorable decision. Government
appeals from IJ decisions amount to only a small fraction of the BIA’s caseload and are
not even reported separately by the EOIR. Moreover, to the extent that many respondents
are unrepresented in immigration court, the odds against finding pro bono counsel to
appeal to the BIA after a final order of removal has been entered are high.83
Figure 2: IJ Decisions (Proceedings) Appealed to BIA and to Circuit Courts84

While the appeal rate from immigration court to the BIA ranged between 9–12% in
this period, the rate of appeal from BIA decisions to the circuit courts was consistently
between 39% to almost 50%, representing the number of appeals received by the BIA
relative to the number of petitions for review subsequently filed. The statistics do not
permit an exact calculation for several reasons: some immigration cases are appealed
directly from district courts, many types of decisions are barred by statute from judicial
review, and some cases are remanded to immigration court following a motion rather
than an appeal. While the absolute numbers have declined somewhat, the circuit courts
continue to grapple with a huge immigration caseload as many noncitizens persist in
seeking more meaningful review in federal court following summary BIA decisions.
Even the likelihood that the ensuing review will not be fruitful is an insufficient deterrent
to the consistent flow of petitions for review.85
83

In 2009, only 24% of respondents made applications for relief, FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra
note 79, at N-1, Fig. 22. Only 39% of respondents were represented. Id. at G-1, Fig. 9. Evelyn Cruz,
Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Summary
Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 497 (2005).
84
These figures were derived from two sources: JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009 supra note 6, at Table B-3 and
FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 79, at Y1, Fig. 32.
85
The BIA’s own internal figures reported in the Immigration Law Advisor, an in-house newsletter,
indicate that for the past three years, the numbers have been fairly steady. Unaccountably, they do not
correspond exactly to the data provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (see Figure 2).
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FY 2009 witnessed a drop in appeals to the BIA for the first time since 2002.
Following a growth of 13% in 2008, filings fell 27%.86 But when measured against the
number of appeals filed from BIA decisions, the rate of appeal of BIA cases to the circuit
courts slipped only slightly from 40.4% in 2005 to 39.4% in 2009.87 While the absolute
number of filings appears to have decreased in the past year, the nationwide filings from
BIA decisions have a long way to recede before returning to their pre-streamlining
numbers of 1936 in 1998, 1731 in 1999, 1723 in 2000, and 1760 in 2001, the final year
before the surge.88
One measure of the effectiveness of the BIA’s appellate role is the number of cases
remanded by the circuit courts. With its emphasis on productivity, streamlining depends
on speed and the routinized review of a high volume of cases. This raised the concern
that individual board members would be unable to devote adequate attention and
concentration to all cases. As a result, board review would be less thoughtful, thorough
and nuanced, resulting in more error-correction by the federal courts.
This prophecy found support in some of the more damning pronouncements of
circuit court judges, including Judge Richard Posner’s now-famous declaration that in
2005, 40% of BIA appeals were reversed in whole or in part by the Seventh Circuit.89 A
disturbing number of those reversals, as well as reversals in other circuits, derived from
problems with adverse credibility determinations in asylum cases. These decisions are
more subjective and depend on an IJ’s personal inferences and logic. Thus, they may not
be supportable in the cold light of the record on appeal.90 These decisions were then
routinely affirmed by the BIA, often by an AWO. Writing about the Second Circuit, John

2007
2008
2009
4932
4510
4829
John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for December 2007, IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 2008, at 5
[hereinafter Guendelsberger 2007]; John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for December 2008,
IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 2009, at 6 [hereinafter Guendelsberger 2008]; John Guendelsberger, Circuit
Court Decisions for December 2009, IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 2010, at 4 [hereinafter Guendelsberger
2009].
86
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2009, supra note 6, at 5.
87
This figure was obtained by dividing the number of appeals from the board filed in the circuit courts by
the number of appeals received by the BIA. See supra Figure 2.
88
LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2002 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR Table B-3 (2002), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2002/front/jdbusiness.pdf [hereinafter
JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 2002].
89
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829–30 (7th Cir. 2005).
90
The Ninth Circuit reports that it reversed 20% of the adverse credibility determinations between January
2005 and March 2008. Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). Edward Grant, a Board
member, reported that in the first two months of 2006, two-thirds of all reversals in asylum cases,
amounting to seventy cases, were due to unsupportable adverse credibility determinations made by IJs and
affirmed by the BIA. Grant, supra note 10, at 959. His account, however, cites this as a successful, rather
than troubling statistic. Id. at 958. Another author provides data that over an eleven-year period from 1995
to 2005, there were only 138 credibility reversals. Eric M. Fink, Liars and Terrorists and Judges, Oh My:
Moral Panic and the Symbolic Politics of Appellate Review in Asylum Cases, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2019, 2032 (2008). This disparity can be explained by the dates in the Fink survey which largely pre-date
streamlining and the explosion of circuit court criticism.
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Palmer describes an “explosion of precedential decisions addressing issues of
credibility,” that in turn guide the volumes of summary orders.91
John Ashcroft disputed that single-judge decisions and AWOs were less accurate
than three-member written decisions by citing a BIA study that found no significant
difference in the reversal rate pre- and post-streamlining.92 In early post-streamlining
years, this confidence certainly was not justified, given the 17.5% reversal rate. The
BIA’s performance has improved more recently. According to the EOIR’s Immigration
Law Advisor, the overall reversal rate for all circuits in 2009 was 540 cases, amounting to
11.2% of the total.93 Table 3 shows a decline in the reversal rate over the past four years,
although the numbers in the individual circuits fluctuate. Optimistically, this drop could
be attributed to improved performance by the BIA and the IJs in response to the
criticisms of the federal bench as well as the effect of some reforms instituted after 2006
as responses to those criticisms. The BIA’s reduced use of AWOs, allowing circuit courts
to rely on more developed reasoning, could offer another explanation. Finally, there
might be more reliance on discretion at the federal appellate level resulting in a greater
use of stipulated remands without court involvement. None of these hypotheses have
been tested, but all individually or in combination might contribute to the decline.
Table 3: Circuit Court Reversal Rate by Circuit 2006–200994
Circuit/Year
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
All Circuits

2006
7.1%
22.6%
15.8%
5.2%
5.9%
13.0%
24.8%
11.3%
18.1%
18.0%
8.6%
17.5%

2007
3.8%
18.0%
10.0%
7.2%
8.7%
13.6%
29.2%
15.9%
16.4%
7.0%
10.9%
15.3%

2008
4.2%
11.8%
9.0%
2.8%
3.1%
12.0%
17.1%
8.2%
16.2%
5.5%
8.9%
12.6%

2009
5.6%
5.5%
16.4%
3.3%
4.0%
8.6%
14.3%
7.7%
17.2%
1.8%
7.1%
11.2%

A closer look at just 2009 shows an interesting relationship between the volume of
appeals and the rate of reversals in each circuit. In the Second Circuit, with its substantial
caseload and its administrative solution, the reversal rate is lower than some other circuits
with smaller immigration dockets. In the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, all benches
vocal in their criticisms of immigration court decision making, the reversal rate is
consistently higher than the average. Although it might appear from these numbers that
the Second Circuit is less inclined to reverse the BIA than other circuits, when the
91

Palmer, supra note 8, at 997. During a four and a half year period ending in mid-2006, he reports twentytwo decisions in which the Second Circuit was critical of the agency’s credibility findings, seventeen of
which were reversed. Id. at 987.
92
Ashcroft & Kobach, supra note 10, at 2009, citing Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 4; see
also, Palmer, supra note 1, at 61.
93
Guendelsberger 2009, supra note 85.
94
Guendelsberger 2007, supra note 85, at 5; Guendelsberger 2008, supra note 85, at 6; Guendelsberger
2009, supra note 85, at 4.
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number of reversals is examined rather than the rate of reversals, the picture becomes
more nuanced.
Table 4: EOIR—Total Numbers of Cases Affirmed or Reversed by Circuit Courts, 200995
Circuit
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh

Total Cases
71
1394
329
180
252
162
77
78
1956
55
281

Affirmed
67
1317
275
174
242
148
66
72
1619
54
261

Reversed
4
77
54
6
10
14
11
6
337
1
20

% Reversed
5.6
5.5
16.4
3.3
4.0
8.6
14.3
7.7
17.2
1.8
7.1

All Circuits

4829

4289

540

11.2

The Second and Ninth Circuits, whose caseloads each exceed the total number of cases in
the nine other circuits combined, together issued 69% of all decisions, and were
responsible for 14% and 62% of all reversals respectively.96
The figures reported in the EOIR’s Statistical Year Book concerning numbers of
cases received by the BIA on remand from the circuit courts are different, revealing a
much higher remand rate.
Table 5: BIA Receipts by Type—Circuit Court Remand97
FY 2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

1290

1792

2155

1457

997

It is difficult to explain the difference in these figures unless there is a distinction
between “remand” and “reversal.”98 Reports seem to use these two terms
interchangeably. Possibly, the former signifies all cases sent back to the BIA that were
not only court-ordered but also followed an administrative action, such as settlement or
procedural default. Even accounting for a certain number of abandoned appeals, this
suggests that there could be considerable informal activity between the circuits and the
95

Guendelsberger 2009, supra note 85, at 4.
Id.
97
FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 79, at T2, Table 16. It is also possible that some cases are
appealed to the circuit courts more than once.
98
Various sources use the terms “remand” and “reverse” without explanation of the differences, leading to
the conclusion that they are not consistently or accurately used. Generally, a “remand” means that the court
sends a case back to the EOIR for further proceedings, whether following a decision in favor of the
petitioner or an order granting a remand based on the government’s motion or stipulation. The outcome of
the remand might even be to reach the same conclusion but with a bettered reasoned decision. The term
“reversal” might be used to describe a decision that is found erroneous on the law, requiring a “remand” for
proceedings, or in some instances, a final ruling. For the purpose of this Article, the use of either term
signifies at least a temporary disagreement between the circuit court and the BIA.
96
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BIA when Department of Justice lawyers become involved in assessing potential errors,
thus consent to remand. In contrast, a “reversal” may relate only to substantive legal
decisions, including final orders in addition to remands. Regardless of the terminology,
these two categories represent cases in which the circuit courts found error.
2. Four Possible Reasons for the System-Wide Decline
i. Decrease in Cases and Appeals at the Agency Level
As discussed above, the flood of immigration cases filed in a circuit court
principally derives from asylum and forms of related relief. While other categories of
cases also are appealed—disputes about criminal grounds of deportation, denials of
applications for other grounds of relief such as cancellation of removal, or claims of
citizenship—asylum cases generally contributed the most to the spike.99 This led to the
creation of the Second Circuit NAC, which hears all asylum cases in the first instance.
Between 2005 and 2009, the numbers of cases in the immigration adjudication
system decreased overall. Immigration court completions in cases with applications for
relief decreased from 80,526 to 69,442.100 During this period, the number of asylum cases
received in immigration court, both affirmative and defensive, declined substantially
from 53,904 to 39,279 (27%) while the rate of completions dropped by 26%.101
Fewer cases overall and fewer completions mean fewer appeals. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the number of completed BIA appeals in the same years diminished from
27,364 to 17,866.102 A straightforward conclusion to draw from these figures is that the
pipeline from application through agency adjudication to circuit court review is less
clogged.
ii. Decrease in Asylum Denials, Increase in Representation
In addition to fewer cases overall, the rate of asylum cases favorably decided on the
merits in immigration court “significantly increased” between 2005 and 2009 from 38%
to 47%.103 The absolute number of cases granted actually dropped by about 500, no doubt
due to the overall decrease in cases. But the absolute number of denials also dropped by
7671 to only 11,358.104 In addition, approximately 2000 applicants were granted
withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA),105 and
almost 400 were granted relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT),106 further
reducing the combined denial rate. While not everyone whose asylum application is
99

See Newman, supra note 36, at 430; JOHN M. WALKER, CHIEF JUDGE’S REPORTS OF THE SECOND
CIRCUIT (2005), available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Reports/05/open.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
100
FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 79, at N1, Fig. 22.
101
Id. at I1, Fig. 13; I2, Fig. 14.
102
Id. at T2, Table 17.
103
Id. at K1-2, Figs. 16, 17, 18. In September 2010, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
[TRAC] reported that 21,589 asylum cases were denied in immigration court in 2009, a 52.5% denial rate.
They project that the denial rate will be even lower in 2010 at 50.1%. See TRAC Immigration Asylum
Decisions in Immigration Courts, SYRACUSE UNIV. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240/include/asylumtime.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
104
FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 79, at K1, Fig. 16.
105
Id. at K4, Fig. 19-A; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2011).
106
FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 79, at M1, Table 9; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2011).
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denied appeals to the BIA and beyond, this sharp increase in grant rates translates into far
fewer appeals at all levels.
Putting these pieces together, Figure 3 shows declines at every level. Most notably,
the almost 10,000 fewer cases completed at the BIA means that many fewer cases are
likely to be appealed to the circuit courts.
Figure 3: Comparison of Immigration Court and BIA Completions, 2005 and 2009107

iii. Immigration Court Backlog
Another explanation for the slowdown in appeals is the growing backlog of
pending cases in immigration courts nationwide, resulting in delays of more than a year
before there is an order to appeal. Overall, the number of pending, incomplete cases has
increased about 20% since the end of FY 2008, and is 82% higher than ten years ago.108
During the first nine months of 2010, New York State was second only to California in
the number of pending cases: 42,256.109 Connecticut, whose immigration cases also are
appealed to the Second Circuit, had 1432 pending cases.110 More critically, in New York,
the average time from commencement of a case to its resolution is 469 days and, in
Connecticut, 266 days.111 Although the statistics do not break down according to type of
107

FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 79, at N1, Fig. 22. Another factor to consider in the
context of the Second Circuit is the grant rate in the immigration courts that feed to that court. The New
York court’s grant rate is 73%, the highest in the country. Of the other immigration courts in the circuit,
Hartford’s grant rate is 31%, Buffalo’s is 29%. The grant rates at Batavia and Varick Street, the two
detention center courts, are 15% and 20% respectively but those courts hear far fewer asylum claims. FY
2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 79, at N2, Table 11.
108
Immigration Court Backlog Tool, Pending Cases and Length of Wait in Immigration Courts (through
Sept. 27, 2010), SYRACUSE UNIV. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.; see generally Julia Preston, Study Finds Immigration Courtrooms Backlogged, N.Y.TIMES, June 18,
2010, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/18/us/18immig.html.
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case, presumably cases in which relief is requested, a relatively small fraction of the total
number of immigration court matters112 take longer to resolve since they require more
preparation and a hearing on the merits.
“The system is in turmoil,” bemoans the Seventh Circuit bench when criticizing the
conditions under which IJs work.113 Immigration court resources are inadequate.114 The
size of the dockets, the absence of adequate law clerk support, the often poor quality of
lawyering and interpretation, the disturbing histories of many individuals appearing
before them, and the stress of making decisions in cases with serious human
consequences all contribute to IJs’ sub-par performance.115 Often a hearing consumes
many hours, so only a few cases can be finished each day. Although respondents may
have incentives to delay in order to postpone an anticipated removal order, even someone
eager to resolve his or her case cannot obtain a hearing date in less than a year from the
initial appearance at a Master Calendar. Even with the decrease in caseload, therefore, the
court simply is not efficient.
The simplest reason for the backlog may be that there are not enough effective
active IJs to efficiently and fairly handle this taxing caseload. In the face of this
deficiency, the EOIR has made hiring judges a priority.116 But hiring has not kept pace
with attrition or with the number of allocated positions, so little progress has occurred.
Despite this commitment to hiring and some hiring success, the total number of judges
increased by only nine over the past five years and unfilled positions remain.117
In combination with the reduction of cases filed and the decrease of asylum denials,
inefficiency at the immigration court with its resultant slowdown in completing cases
obviously has a domino effect on appeals to the BIA and then to the circuit courts.
Although the BIA appears productive due in large part to the immigration court’s
bottleneck and to the impact of streamlining, this impression is illusory. If more IJs are
appointed, presumably the backlog will lessen once the immigration court has more
capacity. Sooner or later the immigration court cases will be completed, resulting in an
increase in BIA and circuit court appeals.

112

See supra Figure 3.
Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 886 n.2 (7th Cir. 2007).
114
Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 184–94
(2006) (statement of Judge John J. Walker, C. J., U.S. Court of Appeals for 2d. Cir.) [hereinafter Hearing].
115
A recent study reported considerable burnout on the immigration bench as a result of the stress of the
decisions made daily as well as the lack of support or rewards on the job. Stuart L. Lustig, Kevin Delucchi,
Lakshika Tennakoon, Brent Kaul, Dana Leigh Marks & Denise Slavin, Burnout and Stress Among
Immigration Judges, BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL., Jan. 1, 2008, at 2. The latter two authors of this study are
the president and vice-president, respectively, of the National Association of Immigration Judges, the
certified representative and recognized collective bargaining unit of the IJs since 1979. See NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES, http://www.fairness.com/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). The NAIJ was
unsuccessful in its attempt to become recognized by the National Labor Relations Board as a collective
bargaining unit. 56 F.L.R.A. 616, 620 (2000). The recommendations of the burnout survey correspond in
large part to the kinds of reforms urged by the judges’ union.
116
See Osuna Statement, supra note 77.
117
One out of every six positions is vacant. Immigration Case Backlog Continues to Grow, SYRACUSE
UNIV. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Mar. 2010),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/225/.
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iv. More Detained Cases

Respondents who are not detained are more likely to appeal an order of removal to
the court of last resort, particularly after a summary affirmance by the BIA.118 Although
not all non-detained respondents are in the same situation, generally they have greater
access to counsel, continue to earn money for legal fees while awaiting the outcome of
the cases over several years, are able to remain with their families, and might use the
extra time to make arrangements for departure if all else fails. For detainees, however, the
protracted time accompanying multiple appeals will be spent in custody, an enormous
deterrent to continuing the case. Since most detainees face removal for criminal grounds,
they have fewer reasons to hope for a favorable outcome and they are legally precluded
from release during the pendency of their proceedings. Furthermore, detainees have less
access to counsel, either as a result of a transfer to an out-of-state ICE facility or simply
because visiting detention centers is more difficult, increasing the difficulty of raising
potential claims at the immigration court or on appeal119 These are all powerful
disincentives to appeal, particularly to the federal courts.
Figure 4: Immigration Court and BIA Completions for Detained Cases120

During the four years from 2005 to 2009, there was a substantial increase in the
number of detained cases in immigration court proceedings. In 2005, 91,392 cases were
completed on the detained docket in immigration court. By 2009, the immigration court
completed 144,763 detained cases. The mandatory detention provisions of the INA led to
118

The Palmer study found that the increase in appeals largely occurred in cases where the respondent was
not detained. Palmer et al., Surge in Petitions, supra note 1, at 7.
119
The BIA sponsors a pro bono project in an effort to secure more representation. See Legal Orientation
and Pro Bono Program, OFFICE OF LEGAL ACCESS PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/probono/probono.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). The representation rate on
appeals from IJ decisions has increased from 62% to 77% between 2005 and 2009. FY 2009 STATISTICAL
YEAR BOOK, supra note 79 at W1, Fig. 30.
120
FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 79, at O1, Fig. 23; id. at X1, Fig. 31.
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this noticeable increase.121 In addition, several DHS programs whose goals are the
apprehension and removal of individuals likely or required to be detained pending their
case completion complemented the statutory requirements.122 As Figure 4 shows, BIA
completions of removal cases, however, remained static with a slight decrease from 3571
cases in 2005 to 3361 cases in 2009. EOIR statistics do not detail how many detained
cases involved applications for relief or the percent in which relief was granted at either
the immigration court of the BIA. However, the small fraction of cases appealed from the
growing detained docket implies that many detainees do not request relief; in addition,
those who do and whose applications are denied appeal at a very low rate.
Just as several factors contributed to the cresting of the wave of appeals, multiple
factors contribute to its recession. But unlike the surge, there are no statutory or
regulatory changes which point to an obvious causal link. The volume of cases, the grant
rate for asylum claims, the court backlog, and the number of detained cases are factors
not grounded in law. Rather, they reflect individual agency decisions, programs, and
priorities that could be compounded or ameliorated by changes of policy rather than law.
With these changes, the adjudication picture could react once again.
B. Pressures on the Agency to Respond
The flood of circuit court immigration cases has had an ineluctable impact on the
administrative agency. Academics, NGOs, legislators, government commissions, and bar
associations have long proposed various reforms to immigration adjudication. Within the
world of immigration practice, the inadequacies of immigration court proceedings have
been legendary. Advocates and professional groups have inveighed against the Ashcroft
streamlining reforms. But all of the criticism had been confined largely to this relatively
insular world. The bad news was so insular that there was little hope for meaningful
reform. This has changed in the wake of the surge.
The nationwide explosion of immigration appeals required circuit court judges to
peer through the looking glass into the previously largely-overlooked world of
immigration courts and the immigration bar. The circuit courts became increasingly vocal
about the quality of immigration adjudication on both the trial and appellate levels. Due
to the stature of the federal bench, appellate judges’ criticisms drew the attention of the
media, then the public, and finally provoked a response from the Attorney General. The
spirit of reform, including greater transparency and accountability, is in the air. Some
progress has occurred, though much remains to be accomplished.
1. Pressures on Immigration Judges to Improve Their Performance
i. From the Circuit Courts
During the early years of the surge, circuit court judges became increasingly vocal
about the poor quality of immigration adjudication on both the trial and appellate level.
Federal judges were reading transcripts of proceedings conducted by impatient or
unreasonable immigration judges leading to decisions that were inadequately or
121

Immigration and Nationality Act § 236 (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2010).
See, e.g., Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
122
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illogically reasoned.123 Because the board’s analysis often lacked substance, or was
incomplete and/or inconsistent with the IJ’s reasoning, circuit courts have borne the
unexpected burden of reviewing the original record in immigration court, in addition to
any BIA decision.
As the docket grew, so did judicial awareness and intolerance of the flaws of
immigration adjudication. The forceful and attention-grabbing criticisms of immigration
court decisions and immigration judges by now are well-known.124 In some circuits, most
notably the Seventh, criticism has been sharp and unrelenting.125 The Second,126 Third,127
and Ninth128 Circuits also actively reproached IJs.
The caustic, even impatient, descriptions of immigration proceedings voiced by
many prestigious circuit court judges stemmed as much from frustration with the
increased burdens placed on their own courts as from reactions to poor decision making
at the administrative level. In many cases, the review concluded that the IJ’s reasoning
was illogical, unsupported by the record, or simply lacking sufficient analysis. In others,
the federal court perceived hostility, stereotyping, intolerance, and abusive behavior. On
occasion, the proceedings in immigration court were so unfair that the circuit court found
a due process violation.129 In some cases, the circuit judges were so troubled by the
123

Lindsey R. Vaala, Bias on the Bench: Raising the Bar for U.S. Immigration Judges to Ensure Equality
for Asylum Seekers, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1012, 1023–27 (2007).
124
See Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at
A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/26/national/26immigration.html?pagewanted=all.
125
Judge Richard A. Posner decried the “systematic failure by the judicial officers of the immigration
service to provide reasoned analysis for the denial of applications for asylum.” Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft,
366 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004).
126
See, e.g., Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 142, 148–51 (2d Cir. 2006); Meizi Liu v. B.I.A, 167 F. App’x.
871, 873 (2d Cir. 2006) (IJ showed “pervasive bias and hostility”); Hajderasi v. Gonzales, 166 F. App’x.
580, 582 (2d Cir. 2006) (judge was sarcastic and badgering); Sun v. B.I.A., 247 Fed. App’x. 275, 276–78
(2d Cir. 2007) (resulting in removal of judge from case); see also, Marc Hurwitz, Removing Judges: The
Cases of Immigration Judges Jeffrey Chase and Noel Ferris, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 114, 114 (2010).
127
The Third Circuit also described patterns of unacceptable misconduct in several decisions. See, e.g.,
Wang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 261 (3d Cir. 2005); Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 159 (3d
Cir. 2005); Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 411 F.3d 135, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2005). Several other Third Circuit
opinions chastised immigration judges for lacking neutrality, interjecting intemperate remarks, and being
sarcastic. See, e.g., Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 638 (3d Cir. 2006); Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 272, 292 (3d Cir. 2005); Wang, 423 F.3d at 269. The Third Circuit’s patience was sorely tried by
one Philadelphia immigration court judge in particular. The circuit court’s repeated castigation of this
judge, personally named in four decisions, appears to have led to his removal from the Philadelphia
immigration court. Third Circuit’s New Role as Activist Court on Immigration Issue, 51 VILL. L. REV. 981,
986 (2006); Marisa Taylor, Immigration Judges Under Scrutiny, MIAMI HERALD, July 5, 2006, at 9A; see,
e.g., Cham v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 445 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2006); Shah v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 446 F.3d
429, 436 (3d Cir. 2006); Sukwanputra, 434 F.3d at 638 n.11; Fiadjoe, 411 F.3d at 154 (3d Cir. 2005). He
was described in each of these decisions as a bullying and insensitive. See, e.g., Fiadjoe, 411 F.3d at 154;
see also Recent Case, Third and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in Immigration Courts, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2596, 2597–99 (2006).
128
See, e.g., Recinos De Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F. 3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005); Rivera v. Ashcroft, 387
F.3d 835, 842 (criticized for acting as prosecutor) (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 394 F.3d 1129
(9th Cir. 2005); Reyes-Melendez, v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003) (criticized for being
impartial and hostile); Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (criticized for
“prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and conjecture”).
129
See, e.g., Hassani v. Mukasey, 301 F. App’x. 602, 603 (9th Cir. 2008) (IJ excluded testimony of several
witnesses).
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conduct of the IJ that they remanded for reconsideration before a different judge, an
unusual interference with administrative authority by the agency.130 Even if some federal
judges expressed an understanding for the pressures of the overworked, under-resourced
immigration bench,131 most comments were embarrassing and even damning.
The loud denunciations by prestigious federal circuit courts have cast a muchneeded spotlight on the quality of the immigration bench. The outcry drew attention from
the legal profession at large and finally captured the attention of someone with power to
respond: the Attorney General, under whose authority the EOIR functions.
ii. From the Attorney General
Criticism of the immigration court is not new, but in the past it tended to
concentrate on structures, operations, and lack of independence rather than on individual
performance in applying the law and assessing facts.132 As new and upsetting attention
from prestigious and vocal circuit court judges widened the window of immigration court
scrutiny, then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales was compelled to respond to the
revelations of myriad inadequacies in the quality of adjudication, the resources made
available to the immigration courts, and the plight of litigants appearing there.
In January 2006, Gonzales made news when he announced an investigation into the
immigration court.133 About eight months later, he publicized his twenty-two measures to
improve the quality and efficiency of immigration courts and the BIA.134

130

See, e.g., Huang v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d. 142, 150–51 (2d Cir. 2006); Mece v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 562,
578 (6th Cir. 2005); Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1230 (9th Cir. 2005).
131
See, e.g., Metko v. Gonzales, 159 F. App’x 666, 670 (6th Cir. 2005) (Martin, J., concurring) (“Although
I am sympathetic with the difficulties faced by immigration courts and its caseload . . . [l]et us not forget
the impact of these hearing on the lives of the individual involved. The least we can ask of the immigration
court is to provide a thorough and complete analysis for its determination beyond identifying minor
inconsistencies, cultural differences, or language barriers.”); see also N’Diom v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494,
500 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boyce, J., concurring) (“There are no doubt many conscientious, dedicated, and
thorough immigration courts across the country. Unfortunately, their hard work is overshadowed by the
significantly increasing rate at which adjudication lacking in reason, logic and effort . . . is reaching the
federal circuits.”).
132
In 1990, Professor Deborah Anker concluded, “[T]he current adjudicatory system remains one of ad hoc
rules and standards . . . In other words, there is a significant disparity between the law ‘as stated on the
books,’ and the law as implemented and practiced.” Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the
United States—Summary Report of an Empirical Study of the Adjudication of Asylum Claims Before the
Immigration Court, 2 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 252, 255 (1990).
133
In making the announcement, Gonzales noted:
I have watched with concern the reports of immigration judges who fail to treat aliens
appearing before them with appropriate respect and consideration and who fail to produce
the quality of work that I expect from employees of the Department of Justice . . . . I
believe there are some [immigration judges] whose conduct can aptly be described as
intemperate or even abusive and whose work must improve.
Memorandum of Alberto Gonzalez, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Immigration Judges (Jan. 9, 2006) (announcing
a “comprehensive review of the immigration courts”), available at www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/ag010906.pdf; see also Ann M. Simmons, Some Immigrants Meet Harsh Face of Justice, L.A.TIMES, Feb. 12,
2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/12/nation/na-judges12; Pamela MacLean, Nonjudicial,
Injudicious Complaints Spur Attorney General to Investigate Lawyers Serving as Immigration Judges,
MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Feb. 2, 2006; Pamela MacLean, Immigration Judges Come Under Fire, NAT’L L.
J., Jan. 30, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005446065.
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This 2006 initiative sowed seeds for reform from within, strengthened arguments
for an infusion of more resources into the courts, and highlighted the need for
mechanisms to monitor IJ performance.135 According to EOIR leadership, many
improvement measures have been accomplished: an updated Immigration Judge
Benchbook,136 an Immigration Court Practice Manual,137 a Code of Conduct for
Immigration Judges and Board Members,138 a published procedure for lodging
complaints against IJs,139 and the establishment of a regional system of supervisory IJs.140
The EOIR’s efforts have received mixed reviews. Some real progress has taken
place, but significant deficiencies remain, particularly in hiring new IJs and in assuring
the performance quality of newly appointed and existing IJs.141 Although the appointment
134

Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for
Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.doj.gov/opa/pr2006/August06_ag_520.html; see also Nina Bernstein, Immigration Judges
Facing Yearly Performance Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, at A15,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9406E0DB1F3FF933A2575BC0A9609C8B63.
135
Unquestionably this attention provokes negative responses from the immigration judges themselves,
who reportedly suffer from stress and burnout even without demoralizing public criticism of their
performance. One IJ reported: “[T]he Attorney General’s initiatives and demands on our court system has
created the ‘poster child’ for a hostile work environment and fueled a media frenzy of criticism from many
who have no meaningful understanding of what we do as judges.” Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’
Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout
Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 72 (2008).
136
Immigration Judge Benchbook, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV.,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/index.html (last accessed Oct. 1, 2011).
137
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF THE CHIEF IMMIGR. JUDGE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (last updated April 1, 2008).
138
Codes of Conduct for the Immigration Judges and Board Members, 72 Fed. Reg. 35510 (June 28, 2007).
This code has been incorporated into the U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., ETHICS
MANUAL (2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/handbook.pdf.
139
Immigration Judge Conduct and Professionalism, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR.
REV., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/IJConduct/IJConduct.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
140
For a general progress report, see Report from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., to
U.S. Congress (May 2009), available at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/210/include/EOIR_Report_to_Congress_0905.pdf; Fact Sheet, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., EOIR’s Improvement Measures—Update (June 5, 2009),
available at www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/EOIRs22ImprovementsProgress060509FINAL.pdf;
Memorandum from Kevin Rooney, Director, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., to All
Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev. Employees (March 2007), available at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/194/include/RooneyMemoMarch2007.pdf (claiming that nine of
twenty-two improvement measures had been fully implemented).
141
Immigration Courts: Still a Troubled Institution, SYRACUSE UNIV. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (June 9, 2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/210. In 2010 alone, the Attorney
General appointed forty-two new IJs. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Off. for Immigr.
Rev., EOIR Swears in New Immigration Judge (Apr. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/YorkIJClementeInvestiture04212010.pdf; News Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., The Executive Office for Immigration Review Swears in
Four New Immigration Judges (May 17, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/IJInvestiture05142010.htm; News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., The Executive Office for Immigration Review Swears in Six New
Immigration Judges (Sept. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/IJInvestiture09172010.pdf; News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., The Executive Office for Immigration Review Swears in 23 New Immigration
Judges (Nov. 8, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/IJInvestiture11052010.pdf

29

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

and attrition rates for IJs thwarted real progress in increasing the number of judges, in
2010 and 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder appointed fifty new IJs, bringing the total
to an all-time high of 272.142 Perhaps even more significantly, the details of the hiring
process were made public.143 This represents meaningful progress toward greater
transparency and, was likely a response to the 2008 disclosure of blatant and improper
use of political criteria for EOIR appointments under the Bush Administration.144
While the criticisms against immigration court adjudication lodged by circuit court
judges were most vociferous during the early days of the surge, they have not
disappeared entirely. Despite the efforts of the EOIR to improve performance through
better training, improved complaint mechanisms, and more effective monitoring, deep
problems remain. Some immigration judges’ behavior continues to be antagonistic,
inquisitorial, and biased, provoking ongoing negative attention from the federal courts
and others.145
2. Pressures on the BIA
Critics of BIA streamlining focused their disapproval on the regulations permitting
single-judge AWOs and the reduction in the number of board members from twenty-three
[hereinafter November News Release]; News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev.,
The Executive Office for Immigration Review Swears in Nine New Immigration Judges (Dec. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/IJInvestiture12172010.pdf.
142
See Osuna Statement, supra note 77, at 3 (reporting that although budgetary constraints on hiring ended
this initiative, allowing for attrition, the overall number of judges had increased by thirty-six).
143
In a press release, the EOIR announced:
The hiring process for most of these new immigration judges began in December 2009.
After initial screening, EOIR’s human resources section referred 1782 applications to the
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge. Four panels of assistant chief immigration judges
screened the applications for the following criteria: ability to demonstrate the appropriate
temperament to serve as a judge; knowledge of immigration laws and procedures;
substantial litigation experience, preferably in a high-volume context; experience
handling complex legal issues; experience conducting administrative hearings; and
knowledge of judicial practices and procedures. The most highly recommended
candidates were selected for interviews. Top candidates were then referred for a second
review and interview by a panel of senior Department of Justice officials. The Attorney
General made the final selections.
November News Release, supra note 141.
144
See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AN INVESTIGATION
OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL (July 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf; PA.
STATE UNIV., DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW, CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS & NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE
NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, PLAYING POLITICS AT THE BENCH: A WHITE PAPER ON THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT’S INVESTIGATION INTO THE HIRING PRACTICES OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES (2009).
145
See, e.g., Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 491–92 (2d Cir. 2008) (judge’s remarks about homosexuals so
offensive as to abrogate impartiality); Issiaka v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 569 F.3d 135, 143 (3d Cir. 2009)
(critical of IJ’s “prosecutorial manner” and “inquisitorial inquiry”); Kaita v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 522 F.3d
288, 301(3d Cir. 2008) (faulting the IJ’s antagonistic interruptions for “seriously imped[ing]” review); Zuh
v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 508–10, 513 (4th Cir. 2008) (“This judicial sleight of hand constitutes the very
definition of an abuse of discretion.”); Marcia Coyle, Bad Behavior by Judge Reverses Asylum Ruling,
NAT’L L. J. (ONLINE), Jan. 25, 2010 (describing investigation of IJ by Department of Justice’s Office of
Professional Responsibility). In 2010, a legal services organization in Los Angeles lodged a complaint with
the United States Department of Justice about a judge who was described as “rude and intemperate.”
Sandra Hernandez, Complaint Targets Immigration Judge, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 8, 2010.
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to eleven.146 In addition, the modified standard of review limited the BIA’s authority to
review an IJ’s findings of fact de novo.147 The combination of loss of power, resources,
and attention to individual cases raised fears that the board would engage in assemblyline justice and issue poorly reasoned, hasty decisions. Unfortunately, this well-founded
fear has been realized. A few years into the streamlining era, Judge Posner assessed the
situation: “[T]he adjudication of these cases . . . has fallen below the minimum standards
of legal justice.”148
These potential consequences were apparent from the outset, yet the Attorney
General was unmoved. The streamlining initiative was formalized and its salutary effect
on the BIA backlog ensued at the expense of the circuit courts. As one researcher pointed
out, “[o]n a macro level, the BIA reforms are reshaping circuit courts.”149
The BIA persists in defending its productivity and the quality of its decisions, but
critics have had a measurable impact. The stinging reproaches of federal judges prompted
the EOIR to propose revisions to the streamlining regulations that would increase the use
of three-member panels and give board members discretion on whether to issue an AWO
or write an opinion.150 The size of the BIA also increased to fifteen members.151
EOIR claims that in March 2011, the use of AWOs had declined to 2% of the
BIA’s output.152 This marks a remarkable decrease in a strongly disfavored approach to
decision making. Whether there have been real improvements is less clear. Ninth Circuit
judges expressed mixed opinions as to whether there were actually fewer AWO or
streamlined cases.153 These judges did predict that adding resources to the BIA, so that
cases could be “properly decided,” would alleviate the burdens on the circuit courts.154
Since the new regulations only went into effect in 2008, it may be too soon to measure
their impact. However, any reduction in AWOs and any expansion of capacity are
undoubtedly improvements.
Because the federal courts will only tolerate so much interference with their
business, and because the circuit court judges have expressed their distress so vocally, the
BIA was forced to retrench. However, neither the courts nor the EOIR are in a position to
publicly acknowledge that the fallout from the surge—including a barrage of judicial
scrutiny of immigration adjudication practices and frequent censure of the reasoning and
processes in hearings and BIA review—caused the agency to respond, retrench, and
reform.
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See generally DORSEY & WHITNEY, supra note 10.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(D)(3)(ii) (2011).
148
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654
(7th Cir. 2003)).
149
Chad Westerland, The Consequences of Immigration Reform for the U.S. Courts of Appeals 12 (Aug. 3,
2009) (unpublished working paper, University of Arizona), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443381.
150
Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for Panel Review, and
Publication of Decisions as Precedents, 73 Fed. Reg. 34654 (June 18, 2008).
151
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Mukasey Appoints Five New Members to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (May 30, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/08/AGBIAAppointments.pdf.
152
See Osuna Statement, supra note 77, at 5.
153
Law, Rationing Justice, supra note 35, at 37.
154
Id. at 37–38.
147
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IV. THE FLOOD WATERS RECEDE: THE LEGACY OF THE SURGE
The surge of immigration appeals is responsible for changes far beyond court
administration and doctrine. The unprecedented volume of cases, particularly asylum
claims, has exposed circuit court judges to the true state of the previously overlooked
immigration courts and immigration bar. As persistent attention from circuit court judges
raised public awareness of the flaws in the adjudication system, the EOIR has been
forced to respond. The compounding revelations of inadequacies in the quality of
adjudication, resources made available to the immigration courts, and plight of litigants
became impossible to ignore. As a result, seeds of reform were sown from within the
system, the call for additional resources grew stronger, and attention from the public and
the legal profession was increasingly drawn to the need for more access to better
representation.
The impact of the surge has reverberated outside of the self-contained world of the
agency and immigration practitioners. While immigration adjudication reform has never
been far from the sights of some organizations, such as the ABA, the post-surge
community of proponents for reform has expanded markedly.
A. Stimulating Renewed Civic Engagement in Support of Fairer Proceedings and More
Due Process for Immigrants
The INA recognizes a privilege to representation at a removal proceeding but not a
right to appointed counsel at the expense of the government.155 In 1975, the Sixth Circuit
held that due process might compel appointment of counsel in immigration proceedings
when counsel would be necessary to assure “fundamental fairness.”156 Unfortunately, this
ideal has failed to gain traction. As a result, while many individuals retain counsel and
some are represented pro bono, a large number appear pro se. The overwhelming lack of
counsel worries advocacy groups, professional associations, and even legislators about
access to justice and due process for immigrants facing deportation.
Rates of representation in immigration court have not improved significantly over
the 2005 to 2009 time period: from a low of 35% in 2005 to a high of 43% in 2007. In
2009, the rate of representation in completed cases fell to 39%.157 However, individuals
in removal proceedings, particularly when relief is requested, fare much better if
represented by counsel.158 One study describes representation as the “single most
important factor affecting an asylum case.”159 The percentage of represented cases at the
BIA is higher than at immigration court, ranging from 62% to 77%. This is likely
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8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(4)(A) (2011).
Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568 n.3 (6th Cir. 1975).
157
FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 79, at G1, Fig. 3.
158
Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, INSIGHT, 5–6 (Apr. 2005)
http://migrationpolicy.org/insight/insight_kerwin.pdf. One study found that asylum is four to six times
more likely to be granted if the applicant is represented. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathon Jacobs, The
State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 743 (2002).
159
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007).
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attributable to the fact that increased difficulty in finding counsel leads many to simply
forego an appeal to the BIA.160
In addition to the likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the respondent, the
presence of counsel generally leads to greater accuracy, as issues are presented more
clearly and thoroughly. Moreover, for every case in which relief is granted due to the
assistance of counsel, there is one less case to climb the ladder of appellate review.
1. Access to Legal Representation
Concern about the unmet legal needs of immigrants received a renewed boost in the
wake of the surge. On February 28, 2007, Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the Second
Circuit delivered a prestigious lecture at the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York.161 Using an image of a burst dam after years of buildup, Judge Katzmann based his
remarks on his observations of the flood of immigration cases in the preceding five years
in the Second Circuit and nationwide.162
The plight of immigrants who have no representation or who have inadequate
counsel became a cause for the judge and for a “study group” of stakeholders in New
York City that now numbers more than fifty.163 The study group’s task forces authored
substantial reports presented at a spring 2009 symposium164 that were later published in
Fordham Law Review. The reports not only focused on expanding options for pro bono
representation, but also on identifying and overcoming existing barriers to effective
representation, problems of ineffective representation from incompetent lawyers, and the
largely unregulated non-lawyers who provide assistance to, and often take advantage of,
immigrants.165
The work of the study group continues and its membership now includes people
from the circuit court bench, private practice at both large and smaller firms, non-profit
organizations, legal service providers, academia, city government and prosecutor’s
offices, immigration judges, and disciplinary committees. Its core mission remains the
160

FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 79, at W1, Fig. 30. A BIA pro bono project secures
representation for a modest number of detained appellants. Steven Lang, Creating Incentives and
Facilitating Access: Improving the Level and Quality of Pro Bono Representation Before the EOIR, 21
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 41, 46 (2008).
161
A footnoted version appears in Robert A. Katzmann, Lecture, The Legal Profession and the Unmet
Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3 (2008).
162
See id. at 6.
163
For a description of the mission, the history and the work of the study group, see Robert A. Katzmann,
Lecture, Deepening the Legal Profession’s Pro Bono Commitment to the Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453, 455–57 (2009). I am a member of the study group.
164
The symposium “filled an amphitheater at Fordham Law School . . . drawing high-powered lawyers,
judges, academics and city officials who talked bluntly about a dysfunctional system and brainstormed into
the night.” Nina Bernstein, In City of Lawyers, Many Immigrants Fighting Deportation Go It Alone, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at A21, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/nyregion/13immigration.html.
165
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Colyer et al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the Immigrant Poor,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 461, 468–69 (2009); JoJo Annobil, The Immigration Representation Project:
Meeting the Critical Needs of Low-Wage and Indigent New Yorkers Facing Removal, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
517, 523 (2009); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing
Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 543 n.10 (2009);
Careen Shannon, Regulating Immigration Legal Service Providers: Inadequate Representation and Notario
Fraud, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 583 (2009).
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same: to assure competent counsel to individuals in the immigration process at the
earliest possible time.
A second conference convened on May 3, 2011 at Cardozo Law School. The
keynote speaker, retired Justice John Paul Stevens, author of the much-heralded decision
of Padilla v. Kentucky,166 decried the lack of quality legal representation for
immigrants.167 The preliminary findings of the New York Immigrant Representation
Study presented at the conference highlighted the disparity in successful outcomes
created by the lack of representation, particularly in detained cases.168
The call for an appointed counsel system has become more resounding since the
surge introduced Judge Katzmann and so many other federal judges to the defects in the
current system of representation. The judges cannot lobby for such a system, but other
influential groups can. The exhaustive 2010 American Bar Association report Reforming
the Immigration System calls for a system of appointed counsel for indigent noncitizens
as well as categories of vulnerable individuals in removal proceedings.169 A coalition of
nonprofit organizations tried a different tack in 2009. They petitioned the Department of
Justice to promulgate regulations for the appointment of counsel for indigent respondents
in order for the proceedings to be fundamentally fair.170 No response was issued, nor are
there any signs that the agency will ever consider such a dramatic step.
A system of appointed counsel at government expense for any respondent unable to
afford a lawyer may be a quixotic goal. But, with enough pressure from external forces,
some less radical goals might be attainable. For example, in a recent class action on
166

130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (holding that failure to advise criminal defendant of immigration consequences
of a conviction can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel).
167
Cardozo Law School, Immigration Conference at Cardozo, May 3, 2011, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6fKEzQdbcXQ.
168
In cases in which individuals are both represented and not detained, the study found a 74% rate of
successful outcome, whereas for those individuals who are both unrepresented and detained, the success
rate was a mere 3%. KATZMANN IMMIGR. REPRESENTATION STUDY GRP. & VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE
NEW YORK IMMIGRATION REPRESENTATION STUDY: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS (2011), available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/050411immigrant.pdf; see Sam Dolnick, As Barriers
to Lawyers Persist, Immigrant Advocates Ponder Solutions, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/nyregion/barriers-to-lawyers-persist-for-immigrants.html?_r=1; Mark
Hamblett, Study, Forum Stress Plight of Unrepresented Immigrants, N.Y. L.J., May 6, 2011,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202493130604&slreturn=1.
169
ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGR., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM §§ 5.10–5.15 (2010). The ABA is
not alone. This recommendation also appears in Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 159, at 384. There is a
National Working Group on Appointed Counsel in Immigration Proceedings composed of high-level
practitioners. See NAT’L WORKING GRP. ON APPOINTED COUNSEL IN IMMIGR. PROCEEDINGS, MEETING
MATERIALS (2006), available at http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org/pdfs/ImmigrantCounselBinder.pdf
[hereinafter NAT’L WORKING GRP.]; see also Donald Kerwin, Charitable Legal Programs for Immigrants:
What They Do, Why They Matter and How They Can Be Expanded, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, June 2004, at 1, 9;
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, THE CONTINUING SURGE IN IMMIGRATION APPEALS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT: THE
PAST, THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE 29 (2010), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&ContentID=35864&Template=/CM/ContentDis
play.cfm (recommending “aggressive measures . . . to provide poor immigrants with greater access to high
quality legal representation at the administrative levels.”). See generally NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIVIL RIGHT
TO COUNSEL, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
170
See Chuck Roth, Group Including NIJC Files Petition for Rulemaking Seeking Appointed Counsel,
NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR. (June 30, 2009), http://www.immigrantjustice.org/litigation/blog/groupincluding-nijc-files-petition-rulemaking-seeking-appointed-counsel (full text on file with author).
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behalf of detained, incompetent noncitizens in immigration proceedings, a district court
judge ordered appointed counsel for some individuals in that class. 171 Although some IJs
may be more open to the argument that in some cases proceeding without counsel would
violate norms of fundamental fairness, it is unclear whether they could act on this instinct
without at least some regulatory changes authorizing them to do so and, most
importantly, a way to secure financial support from EOIR. Thus far EOIR leadership has
been unwilling to pay for appointed counsel in order to achieve even this modest
improvement.
2. Assuring Effective Assistance of Counsel
The effort to assure greater access to legal representation for immigrants in removal
proceedings is only one part of the struggle to improve the adjudication system. Even
when an individual has an attorney or accredited representative, the performance of the
lawyer can be so incompetent that appellate courts have had to grapple with methods for
redressing these deficiencies in the context of claims of ineffective assistance and in
attorney disciplinary proceedings.
i. Ineffectiveness of Counsel Claims in the Circuit Courts
While circuit courts have taken aim much more frequently at the quality of
adjudication at immigration court and the BIA, incompetent lawyers also have tried the
patience of these judges.172 A majority of circuits have recognized the possibility that due
process requires effective assistance of counsel, a claim that usually arises in the context
of a motion to reopen a removal order.173 Although it is rare for a claim of ineffectiveness
to be so egregious as to violate the demanding “fundamental fairness” standard, many
171

The ACLU has filed a class action seeking a system for determining the need to appoint counsel on
behalf of immigration detainees who are found incompetent to represent themselves. Complaint at 39,
Franco-Gonzales et al. v. Holder, 10-CV-02211 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010), available at http://www.aclusc.org/releases/view/103035. Although the litigation is still pending, the judge ruled that the government
must appoint counsel to two individuals with serious mental disabilities in the class who had pending
proceedings in immigration court. The ruling was based on the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (2011). See also Order, Gokce v. Ashcroft, C02-2568 (W.D. Wash Nov. 17, 2003) reprinted
in NAT’L WORKING GRP., supra note 169, at Table 11 (not adopting Report and Recommendation of
magistrate judge to appoint counsel, but agreeing to “lend assistance” to secure pro bono counsel).
172
In a recent survey, judges reported that immigration is the civil practice area in which they perceived the
quality of representation was lowest and where they most often found disparities in representation,
particularly between the government lawyer and counsel for the respondent. Richard A. Posner & Albert H.
Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330–33 (2011).
173
See, e.g., Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 500–01 (7th Cir. 2001); Saleh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 962 F.2d
234, 241 (2d Cir. 1992). For twenty years, the BIA appeared to recognize the constitutional underpinnings
of such claims. The board developed a framework for analyzing such claims that require movants to clear
certain procedural hurdles before the merits of the claim will be considered. In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec.
637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988); In re Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 556 (B.I.A. 2003). For an example of an
ineffective counsel claim that satisfied the Lozada requirements, see In re Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I. & N. Dec.
472, 473–74 (B.I.A. 1996). In 2009, outgoing Attorney General Michael Mukasey issued In re Compean,
24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 714 (B.I.A. 2009), rejecting the constitutional basis of the twenty-year precedent. The
uncertainty that this decision created was ameliorated by the announcement of newly appointed Attorney
General Eric Holder to reconsider the earlier decision and to refer the matter to the EOIR for public
rulemaking. In re Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (A.G. 2009) (vacating In re Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec.
710).
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cases allege misconduct as a basis of a motion to reopen.174 These claims are rarely
successful at the circuit level,175 but on occasion the frustration of the judges becomes
very clear. Judge Katzmann authored an opinion that not only resulted in a remand, but
also expressed exasperation with the deficient performance of the lawyer:
The importance of quality representation is especially acute to immigrants,
a vulnerable population who come to this country searching for a better
life, and who often arrive unfamiliar with our language and culture, in
economic deprivation and in fear. In immigration matters, so much is at
stake—the right to remain in this country, to reunite a family, or to
work. . . . [G]iven the disturbing pattern of ineffectiveness evidenced in
the record in this case (and, with alarming frequency, in other immigration
cases before us), we reiterate that due process concerns may arise when
retained counsel provides representation in an immigration proceeding that
falls so far short of professional duties as to “impinge[] upon the
fundamental fairness of the hearing.”176
Ineffective representation in immigration proceedings can even spill over into
criminal cases. When a removal order that is the predicate for a charge of illegal reentry
is so tainted by incompetent counsel, a defendant may be able to challenge that charge
without having to first exhaust administrative remedies.177
ii. Policing the Bar
A significant portion of the private immigration bar enjoys a poor reputation for
competency that, on occasion, rises to the level of criminality. Attorney disciplinary
proceedings are one route for monitoring the immigration bar. The Second Circuit
maintains a Committee on Attorney Admissions and Grievances.178 In a recent case, an
immigration attorney, whose clientele was almost exclusively Chinese, was sanctioned
and disbarred from practice in the Second Circuit because “the totality of [her] conduct
leaves us without assurance that she can conform her future conduct in this Court to all
professional and ethical norms.”179 The Ninth Circuit also maintains a “watch list” of

174

Immigration and Nationality Act § 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2010); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2011)
(before the BIA); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 (2011) (before the IJ).
175
In 2009, petitioners in more than fifty cases raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims as a basis for
reopening. All but one was unsuccessful, and that case was remanded on a procedural ground rather than
the merits. Herrera v. Holder, 340 Fed. Appx. 21 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanded as a result of change in agency
policy respecting standard of review of these claims).
176
Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 600–01 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Saleh, 962 F.2d at 241).
177
United States v. Cerna, 603 F.3d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 2010).
178
2D CIR. R. 46.2(b) (Attorney Discipline).
179
In re Jaffe, 585 F. 3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2009). Subsequent to her disbarment from the circuit, Ms. Jaffe
was disbarred from practicing law in New York. See also In re Koenig, 592 F.3d 376, 386 (2d Cir. 2010);
In re DeMell, 589 F.3d 569, 584–85 (2d Cir. 2009) (both attorneys defalcated on immigration matters). The
disciplinary proceeding In re Cox, No. 08–9050–am, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8939, at *1 (2d. Cir. Apr., 29
2010), involved a lawyer who had, and continues to have, an enormous practice before the Second Circuit.
Id. at *9. He was sanctioned for missing deadlines. Id. at *18; see also In re Salomon, 402 Fed. Appx. 546,
549–50 (2d Cir. 2010).
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lawyers who, after several infractions, are noted by the judges and subject to sanctions.180
The EOIR also polices both attorneys and the other representatives qualified to
appear in immigration court and before the BIA.181 The EOIR published a final rule
amending its prior regulations governing standards of professional conduct.182 The
enhanced regulations strengthen the sanction authority of the EOIR to prevent and punish
for fraud, abuse, misrepresentations, frivolousness, and other gross misconduct. The
EOIR maintains a publicly available list of practitioners who have been suspended or
expelled.183
Finally, law enforcement efforts to identify and prosecute lawyers and others
providing fraudulent legal services appear to have increased. Occasionally, the
miscarriage of justice is so egregious that members of the immigration bar or individuals
defrauding immigrants have been found guilty of both criminal and ethical violations.184
But such charges are unusual and only can be brought when the conduct comes to light, a
difficult step for any member of the immigrant community who fears that their own status
would be jeopardized by coming forward.185
B. Stimulating Renewed Calls for Systemic Reform
The dysfunction of immigration courts and the BIA has been the subject of
sporadic concern for many years.186 Periodically, the calls for change amplify as a new
report or congressional hearing pays attention to the situation. The surge and its
accompanying negative attention also may have renewed pressures to try to fix the
broken system.
180

Noonan, supra note 31, at 912.
By regulation, non-attorneys may also represent individuals in proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1292 (2011)
permits recognized organizations, supervised law students or “reputable individuals of good moral
character” to appear in immigration court.
182
Codified as 8. C.F.R. §§ 1001, 1003, 1292 (2011).
183
See List of Currently Disciplined Practitioners, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV.,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/discipline.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
184
See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, An Immigration Attorney Is Accused of Being a Fraud, and His Clients
Scramble for Help, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/nyregion/25immigration.html; Press Release, U.S. Att’ys Office,
Immigration Attorney and Wife Found Guilty of Asylum Fraud (Apr. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2009/nyfo040309b.htm. Many unlicensed and unregulated
individuals and businesses prey on immigrants with false and fraudulent promises of assistance. Recently,
government agencies have become more aggressive in detecting and prosecuting these offenders. See, e.g.¸
Fact Sheet, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Services, USCIS Initiative to Combat the Unauthorized Practice of
Immigration Law (Dec. 8, 2010) (on file with author); Press Release, Dist. Att’y, N.Y. Cnty., District
Attorney Vance Announces Guilty Verdict in Case of Phony Chinatown Immigration Consultant, (Dec. 7,
2010) (on file with author); John Council, UPLC Wins Contempt Case Against Nonlawyer, TEXAS
LAWYER, Sept. 13, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202471874163&slreturn=1.
185
There are some potential visa benefits under the INA that might induce even an undocumented
noncitizen to cooperate with a criminal investigation. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2011) (“snitch visa”). But
these options apparently have not been utilized to any noticeable degree.
186
Over the decades, many structural reforms have been proposed by practitioners, scholars, special
commissions, legislators, and even by the IJs themselves. There are three principal proposals: an Article I
immigration court; an Article III court with an executive administrative law judge component; and an
independent executive agency. See, e.g., Stephen Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59
DUKE L.J. 1635, 1678–85 (2010) (reviewing and critiquing standard proposed structural reforms).
181
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1. Restructuring Immigration Adjudication
In the post-surge era, several unsuccessful efforts to redress immigration litigation
appeared in congressional bills between 2004 and 2007. For the most part, court-related
sections were buried in the midst of many more controversial and consequential
provisions. The proposed Civil Liberties Restoration Acts of 2004 and 2005 sought to
establish an independent regulatory agency known as the Immigration Review
Commission, which essentially preserved the existing structure while expanding the
number of BIA members in a return to more comprehensive administrative appellate
review.187 An obscure provision of one of the comprehensive immigration reform bills
proposed in 2006 included a study of the possibility of consolidating all federal appeals
into a single circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.188 This
proposal failed to gain support either in the Senate, with immigration experts, or with the
public.189 The defeated Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 also contained a
deeply buried provision that increased the number of immigration judges, beefed up their
personnel, and funded more government attorneys prosecuting immigration matters.190
This legislation also increased the number of BIA members and revived the practice of
three-judge panels.191 Finally, in recognition of the need to protect independence, the bill
prohibited the removal or discipline of IJs or BIA members for the exercise of their
“independent judgment and discretion.”192
Persistent but as yet unrewarded efforts to achieve change resurface with regularity
in the post-surge fallout era. Congress periodically holds hearings. The National
Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) continues its push for an independent agency
or Article I court.193 Other new reports and recommendations from both academics194 and
187

Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1502, 109th Cong. § 204 (2005); The Civil Liberties
Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2528, 108th Cong. § 204 (2004), responds to many post-9/11 policies and
practices that are perceived to jeopardize civil liberties. In addition to amendments that address such
developments as mandatory and indefinite detention, closed hearings, and elimination of individualized
detention decisions, the statute attempts to return administrative appellate review to its pre-2003
organization, requiring three-judge panels in all cases and eschewing the practice of affirming without
opinion when the immigration judge has resolved all of the issues in the case. The statute restores the board
to fourteen members who would serve for six-year terms. Immigration judges would be appointed to a term
of twelve years by the head of the commission. The statute provides one feature that has long been sought
by immigration judges and critics of the court: contempt authority. See Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass’n,
Position Paper, The Civil Liberties Restoration Act: A Response to Counterproductive Post-9/11 Policies
(updated July 20, 2006), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=8380.
188
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 707 (2006). This proposal
was criticized by many. See generally Hearing, supra note 114.
189
See generally Hearing, supra note 114; Rachel Swarns, In Bill’s Small Print, Critics See a Threat to
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2006, at A11; Editorial, Don’t Tamper with the Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2006, at A24.
190
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong., §§ 701–07 (2007).
191
Id. at § 702.
192
Id. at § 704.
193
See Executive Office for Immigration Review: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr.,
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 55–62
(2010) (statement of Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, President, National Association of Immigration Judges).
194
Legomsky, supra note 186, at 1686–96, proposes an Article III specialist court with judges serving on a
rotating basis with original trial jurisdiction in the hands of ALJs. The court would be independent of any
political authority. Id. at 1689–92.
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professional organizations195 have joined the chorus. Not all proposals have the same
name, derive power from the same source, or offer the same implementation details, but
all strive for greater efficiency, independence, transparency, professionalism, and
fairness. Even suggestions that do not require that much radical restructuring focus on
principles of quality of adjudicative performance and accountability.196
In this era of stalled immigration reform with all of the attendant controversies, it is
unlikely that a transformation of the immigration adjudication system is in the cards.197
Thus, it is doubtful that the surge ultimately will have a role in reshaping the whole
system. Administrative agency adjudication distresses lawyers and judges, and of course,
the immigrants in the system, but is largely invisible to the public. Therefore, any
improvements to the system may only occur in response to ongoing vigilance by the
federal courts, and continuing concern from civic and professional groups about the
denial to immigrants of access to meaningful justice attained only with competent legal
representation in courtrooms presided over by capable and fair IJs.
2. Encouraging the Use of Prosecutorial Discretion
Another tangential, but potentially powerful, response to the attention resulting
from the surge is the increasing recognition that the system would benefit from a greater
use of prosecutorial discretion to defer cases at the trial level and remand cases at the
appellate level.
Discretion is the hallmark of immigration decision making at all stages—from the
inspectors at the border to the IJs. In immigration court, judges exercise their discretion
daily over such forms of relief as asylum,198 adjustment of status,199 cancellation of
removal,200 or bond determinations.201 In contrast, prosecutorial discretion—the
willingness of the agency to terminate or administratively close proceedings, to consent
195

After an extensive review of all varieties of reform models (with the exception of Prof. Legomsky’s,
proposal, id., published after its report), the ABA endorsed an Article I court as the preferable option, with
a fall-back preference for an independent commission. ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGR., supra note 169, at § 635.
196
For example, one commentator urges that improved Department of Justice management accomplished
by instituting widely accepted judicial performance standards might be the most attainable court reform
option. Russell R. Wheeler, Practical Impediments to Structural Reform and the Promise of Third Branch
Analytic Methods: A Reply to Professors Baum and Legomsky, 59 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1869 (2010). Another
proposal, from a former IJ, suggests a separate merit-selected United States Asylum Court where
consistency in legal and credibility determinations about eligibility for humanitarian relief would be more
likely to occur. Bruce J. Einhorn, Consistency Credibility, and Culture, in REFUGEE ROULETTE:
DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 187–201 (NYU Press ed. 2009).
197
The White House has made well-publicized efforts in the area. See Press Release, The White House,
Background on the President’s Meeting with Senior Administration Officials and Stakeholders on
Immigration (Apr. 19, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/04/19/background-presidents-meeting-senior-administration-officials-and-stakeh. However,
none of the President’s talking points address immigration adjudication. The most recent legislative push,
the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, merely includes a provision to increase resources for
DOJ attorneys and IJs, providing an infusion of some additional resources but no structural changes. S.
1258, 112th Cong. § 207 (2011).
198
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2011).
199
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2011).
200
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (2011).
201
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) (2011).
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to relief, or to stipulate to particular issues—is virtually absent in the everyday practice of
trial attorneys in immigration court despite several aspirational directives from the
highest levels of the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security between 2000 and
2007.202
This reluctance is at least partially responsible for the growing number of federal
appeals. A very frustrated Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., of the Ninth Circuit urged that
“[l]awyers—real lawyers, lawyers exercising discretion, candid with their departmental
client—are the key.”203 He cites a transcript of a particularly egregious hearing at which
the government attorney was groundlessly recalcitrant in his defense of the removal
order. Judge Noonan’s plea for government lawyers—in this instance, OIL attorneys—to
have the authority not to defend an obvious error in the circuit courts echoes the efforts of
outgoing INS Commissioner Doris Meissner to inject more discretion into the entire
system.204 Most recently, John Morton, the director of ICE, issued several reminder
memoranda encouraging the appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion.205 This
exhortation had an impact in Houston’s immigration court where, following a review of a
docket that exceeded 7000 matters, ICE dismissed 200 cases.206 Notwithstanding this
localized effort, a renewed use of prosecutorial discretion along the lines of these
longstanding policies has not spread in any notable fashion to other courts with equally
crippling backlogs.
The cry for more discretion can be heard from all quarters—the bench, the bar, and
academia.207 Not only would the diversion of cases out of the adjudication system
202

Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., to Immigr. &
Naturalization Serv. Reg’l Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, and Reg’l and Dist. Counsel (Nov. 17,
2000), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Meissner-2000-memo.pdf;
Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to all
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor Chief Counsel (Oct. 24, 2005), available at
http://shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretionimmigration2005.pdf; Memorandum from Julie L. Myers,
Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, to all Field Office Dirs. and Special Agents in
Charge (Nov. 7, 2007), available at
http://shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretionimmigration110707.pdf.
203
Noonan, supra note 31, at 915.
204
See Meissner, supra note 202.
205
Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, to all Field Office Dirs.,
Special Agents in Charge, and Chief Counsel (June 17, 2011), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; see also SHOBA
SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, THE MORTON MEMO AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: AN OVERVIEW (2011),
available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Shoba__Prosecutorial_Discretion_072011_0.pdf. This memorandum builds on earlier memoranda, the most recent
of which was issued in June 2010. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enforcement, to all U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement Employees 4 (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf; see also SHOBA
SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, READING THE MORTON MEMO: FEDERAL PRIORITIES AND PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION 8–10 (2010), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Shoba__Reading_the_Morton_Memo_120110.pdf.
206
Susan Carroll, Houston Immigration Cases Tossed by the Hundreds, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 16, 2010, at
A1.
207
ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGR., supra note 169, at §§ 1-60–61; APPLESEED, ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE:
BLUEPRINT TO REFORM AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS 17 (2009), available at
http://www.appleseednetwork.org/Portals/0/Documents/Publications/Assembly%20Line%20Injustice.pdf;
Benson, supra note 27, at 425.
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decrease the court backlog, the proper exercise of discretion could help achieve greater
consistency of outcomes through the use of systematic prosecutorial policies and
guidelines, an approach used with great frequency and little opposition in criminal cases.
This might deflect the criticism of unfair disparities in adjudication.208
V. CONCLUSION
Hopes for comprehensive immigration reform are dimming. Even efforts to redress
more limited aspects of the universally acknowledged broken system have failed.209
Immigration adjudication sits squarely in the middle of this glum and complex situation,
yet structural reform is improbable. The pleas of judges, academics, practitioners, leading
NGOs, and bar associations have not been heeded.
To the extent that there have been changes—adding judges and improving
resources, creating systems for more accountability, better training and oversight, and
greater transparency—we have the surge and its eye-opening effect on the circuit court
judges to thank. The pressure endures as the circuit court docket remains swollen by
immigration cases, as immigration court backlog grows, and as more detainees are
entering the system.210 It is unimaginable that the flaws of the system can be pushed back
into the shadows after all of this exposure. The curtains—and perhaps the swords—are
drawn. Unless improvement is visible and appreciable, the circuit courts will keep
blowing steam that cannot be ignored.
The Second Circuit’s asylum case management plan appears to have triaged the
court’s overload crisis. But the surge has exposed a different crisis that court
administrators alone cannot solve. Fortunately, ever-increasing segments of the bar are
engaged in trying to secure more access to justice for immigrants in a top-down
campaign. These efforts will continue to push for incremental but meaningful changes
that aim to change the system from the bottom up.
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See generally Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 159.
David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/19immig.html.
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Jennifer Ludden, Immigration Crackdown Overwhelms Judges, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 9, 2009),
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